



Humanitarian Law Center

Dossier: Rudnica

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The Dossiers are the product of HLC research on possible perpetrators of war crimes committed during the wars of the 1990s on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The Dossiers aim to present to the general public evidence and information on mass crimes whose perpetrators have not yet been brought to justice. The Dossiers urge government institutions to prosecute all those responsible for war crimes, either as perpetrators or order-givers, or on the basis of command responsibility, in order to establish the rule of law and deal with the violent past in post-Yugoslav states.



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January 2015

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Abbreviations

7th pbr	7th Infantry Brigade of the Yugoslav Army
15th okbr	15th Armored Brigade of the Yugoslav Army
252nd okbr	252nd Armored Brigade of the Yugoslav Army
37th mtbr	37th Motorized Brigade of the Priština Corps of the Yugoslav Army
ex. no.	Exhibit number (number designated for the exhibits presented before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia)
Đorđević	The case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia IT-05-87/1-T, the Prosecutor vs. Vlastimir Đorđević
HLC	Humanitarian Law Center
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
MUP	Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
PJP	Special Police Units of the Republic of Serbia Ministry of Interior
PrC	Priština Corps of the Yugoslav Army
RDB	State Security Department of the Ministry of Interior
RJB	Public Security Department of the Ministry of Interior
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Serbian forces	Yugoslav Army and the Ministry of the Interior
Šainović et al.	The case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia IT-05-87, the Prosecutor vs. Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević and Sreten Lukić
SHTF	„Shiptar terrorist forces“ (a term for the Kosovo Liberation Army usually used in the documents of the Yugoslav Army)
OWCP	Office of the War Crimes Prosecution of the Republic of Serbia
VJ	Yugoslav Army



I. Introduction

The mass grave in Rudnica is the first mass grave on the territory of Serbia discovered after the termination of the mandate of the ICTY to conduct investigations into the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia.

Three mass graves containing the bodies of 889 Kosovo Albanians,¹ mainly civilians, were found in the Spring of 2001 at three locations in Serbia - in Batajnica, a suburb of Belgrade, in Petrovo Selo (eastern Serbia) and by Lake Perućac (western Serbia). In the cases of *Šainović et al.* and *Đorđević*, the ICTY established the facts regarding the circumstances under which the murders of most of the civilians whose remains were exhumed at these three locations had occurred. According to the ICTY's judgments, these crimes were committed as part of the implementation of a joint criminal enterprise whose aim was to establish effective control of Serbian authorities over Kosovo through the changing of the ethnic balance and the deportation of Albanians from Kosovo. In addition, the ICTY established that the MUP had the key role in transporting and hiding the corpses in the aforementioned graves, and that the VJ, independently or in cooperation with the MUP, participated in the collection of corpses in the area.²

In view of the fact that the evidence of crimes resulting in the murders of civilians whose mortal remains were found in Rudnica and the circumstances surrounding the concealing of their bodies were not presented before the ICTY, the aim of this Dossier is to familiarize the public with evidence regarding the responsibility of the members of the VJ and MUP for the killings of Kosovo Albanians whose mortal remains were found in Rudnica, as well as to present the evidence which point to those who participated in the operations of transporting and concealing the bodies at secret locations.

The data used for the preparation of this Dossier come from two main sources. The first source is that of the survivors - witnesses, members of the victims' families and eyewitnesses of the crimes who have given statements to the HLC and HLC Kosovo about the events which preceded the crimes, the circumstances of the crimes, the perpetrators, their uniforms, weapons, equipment, the removal of the victims' bodies, etc. The second source consists of the authentic military and police documents which were presented in the form of exhibits in the two cases before the ICTY mentioned above.³ These include orders to launch military operations, to set up defensive and combat control of the territory, to conduct "the clear-up of the battlefield", to submit regular combat reports and reports on

1 According to the investigation conducted by the HLC and HLC Kosovo, around 7,000 Kosovo Albanian civilians were either murdered or forcibly disappeared in the operations launched by the armed forces of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia in Kosovo in the period from January 1998 to mid-June 1999. List of victims available at www.kosovomemorybook.org

2 ICTY Trial Judgment in the *Đorđević* case rendered on February 23rd 2011, paras. 553, 985, 988, 2118, 2119 and 2121; ICTY Trial Judgment in the *Šainović et al.* case rendered on February 26th 2009, Volume 4, paras. 1356 and 1357.

3 These documents are available to the public through the ICTY Court Records database, at the following ICTY webpage: <http://icr.icty.org/bcs/defaultb.aspx>



the control of movement within a certain area, to register civilians, to deploy police units in the area, etc. In addition to the official documents of the VJ and MUP, the Dossier also relies on the testimony of the VJ officers and MUP officials before the ICTY, the Official Gazette of the Ministry of Defence – the “Vojska” [“Military”] magazine, maps and other sources.

The documents of the VJ and MUP considered by the ICTY in the *Šainović et al.* and *Đorđević* cases are only a part of the VJ's and MUP's archives that are relevant to the operations in Kosovo during 1998 and 1999, and relate first and foremost to the operations during which the crimes included in these two indictments were committed. These documents permit a significant insight into the positioning and engagement of the units in other operations conducted by the VJ and MUP during which crimes against Albanian civilians were committed (and which were not the subject of the aforementioned indictments) and a reconstruction of the larger picture of the VJ and MUP units' activity throughout the entire Kosovo.

However, it should be pointed out that the documents submitted by the VJ and MUP to the ICTY are most likely incomplete; in other words, they do not include all of the documents relevant for the operations in Kosovo during 1998 and 1999 - documents which were, under a reasonable assumption, in the possession of the VJ and MUP. With regard to this, in the *Đorđević* case, the ICTY assessed that this was a matter of an obvious intention to conceal written evidence which was incriminating for members of the VJ and MUP:

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The Chamber concludes that there was a conspiracy of silence at all levels of the MUP and the VJ, as is evidenced from the almost complete absence of any reports, records or minutes of meetings, whether at the highest political, MUP or VJ levels, or of the Joint Command or operative elements of the MUP or VJ, of any information about the progress, success or failure of the efforts of Serbian forces to deal with the KLA, the Kosovo Albanian population, and to ensure there would be no support for a NATO ground force. In the view of the Chamber, it is not feasible to accept that these subjects, which were critical to the very survival of the Serbian government and nation, and were the central focus of the primary effort of the government and Serbian forces, went unreported to, and unknown by, the highest levels of government, MUP, and VJ. In the Chamber's finding, either all written records have been destroyed, or there was a very determined effort at all levels to avoid written records so that there could be nothing on which international investigations could proceed, or both. This leads to the finding that there was reporting, oral and/or written, and knowledge at all top levels, political, VJ and MUP, of the actual activities on the ground in Kosovo, and the progress of operations. This inference is further supported by the few written records that have been found, and conduct which evidences knowledge at the most senior Serbian levels; these records include minutes of meetings, the posting of all available combat ready police to Kosovo (including paramilitaries), and conduct such as the removal and concealment of bodies.⁴

4 ICTY Trial Judgment in the *Đorđević* case rendered on February 23rd 2011, para. 2108.



However, despite the fragmented documentation of the VJ and MUP which is in the possession of the ICTY Court Records database, it is possible to provide a reliable reconstruction of the deployment of units and of the operations in which the civilians whose bodies were found in Rudnica had been killed. The data and evidence presented in this Dossier provide sufficient grounds for launching an investigation against several persons for the execution and concealing of crimes, which they committed either as direct perpetrators and/or for which they had command responsibility. Therefore, the HLC calls on the OWCP to take the necessary action needed to prosecute those responsible for the crimes, without further delay.

The priority of action for the competent institutions must be directed at detecting the location(s) where the bodies of the persons killed together with the persons whose mortal remains were found in Rudnica are buried. The data presented in this Dossier undoubtedly point to individuals and institutions which must have knowledge about what happened with the bodies of the killed persons after the commission of these crimes.

When it comes to finding the remaining secret mass graves containing the bodies of Kosovo Albanians in Serbia, the key preconditions are: the prosecution of the individuals responsible, the unfettered opening of the archives of the VJ and MUP concerning operations in Kosovo and the formation of an independent commission to analyze the archives, as well as the dismissal from public office of any persons who participated in the crimes or operations to hide the bodies, or had any knowledge about the crimes or subsequent operations.

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II. Summary

At the time of the publication of this Dossier (January 2015), the mortal remains of 52 people were exhumed from Rudnica and identified. DNA analysis conducted on the remains has shown that they belong to Kosovo Albanians killed during the Kosovo conflict in 1999. According to a representative of the Commission on Missing Persons of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, search of the Rudnica site will continue if the relevant institutions come up with new data.

Information about the existence of the grave was disclosed by a Kosovo Albanian during the investigation into the “Drenica Group” case, which was conducted before the District Court in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. Relevant institutions have searched this location on several occasions since 2007, and the first human remains were exhumed in 2013.

The mass grave in Rudnica is located right next to a lot of land that has been used by the VJ since an undetermined date before 1999. The VJ built a barracks over it, which, according to the Ministry of Defence, was put into operation in 2002 and then in 2006 handed over to the MUP.

All persons whose bodies were found in Rudnica were civilians who had been killed or forcibly



disappeared in four separate crimes committed by members of the VJ and MUP in April and May 1999 in the Drenica area (area in central Kosovo covering the municipalities of Skënderaj/Srbica and Glllogoc/Glogovac). On the basis of the analysis of available data, the Dossier describes in great detail the four crimes in which the civilians whose bodies were found in Rudnica had been killed. Two military-police actions, carried out in Rezallë/Rezala and Çikatovë e Vjeter/Staro Čikatovo, in the course of which two mass crimes were committed, have been reconstructed to a large extent. At least 68 civilians were killed in these actions, of which 47 were found in Rudnica. In connection with the forcible disappearance, that is the killing of five civilians in Zabel i Ulët/Donji Zabelj and Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo, documents were provided that indicate the presence of certain military and police units in the villages at the time these crimes were committed.

The bodies of 10 persons killed in the crime in Rezallë/Rezala on April 5th 1999 have not yet been found.

The villages where the crimes against the victims whose bodies were hidden in Rudnica took place were at the relevant time in the zone of responsibility of the Yugoslav Army's 37th Motorized Brigade (37th mtbr). During this period, several actions were carried out under the command of the 37th mtbr, in which military as well as police units took part. According to military documents, their task was to "destroy SHTF" ["Shiptar terrorist forces" – author's note]. The 37th mtbr had its home barracks in Raška, had 4,500 members and was equipped with infantry and artillery weapons and tanks.

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Analyses of military and police documents, eyewitness accounts and other sources strongly suggest that the crimes in Rezallë/Rezala and Çikatovë e Vjeter/Staro Čikatovo were committed by members of the 37th mtbr, as part of the "SHTF destruction" actions. Besides the 37th mtbr, the involvement of an as-yet-unidentified police unit in the crime in Rezallë/Rezala was also documented, while in Çikatovë e Vjeter/Staro Čikatovo, a smaller formation of the VJ's 15th Armoured Brigade (15th okbr) and the 86th detachment of the Special Police Units (PJP) were present at the time. Eyewitnesses and survivors of the crime in Çikatovë e Vjeter/Staro Čikatovo and Rezallë/Rezala recognized the military uniforms worn by the members of the Serbian forces who were involved in these crimes.

Based on the available sources, it is not possible to determine with certainty which military unit was responsible for the forcible disappearance of four civilians from the village of Zabel and Ulët/Donji Zabelj. From the testimony of several eyewitnesses, it can be concluded that it was members of the military police. However, military documents point to the presence of the 37th mtbr and the 15th okbr in and around Zabel i Ulët/Donji Zabelj at the relevant time. According to eyewitness accounts, Rrahman Nika was killed by members of the VJ in Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo. According to documents of the Third Army, a substantial part of the 37th mtbr forces were deployed in and around Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo on the day in question.

As for the removal of the bodies of those killed and their transfer to Rudnica, only some of the events and actions of representatives of the institutions of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia that led to the concealment of the bodies in Rudnica have so far been reconstructed.



More specifically, the Dossier has identified only the initial link in the chain of institutions that took part in the removal of the bodies of the murdered civilians.

The so-called 'clearing up of the battlefield' in the area of Rezallë/Rezala, Çikatovë e Vjeter/Staro Čikatovo, Zabel i Ulët/Donji Zabelj and Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo was the responsibility of the 37th mtbr. There is irrefutable evidence indicating that the brigade's Squad for clearing up of the battlefield had first-hand knowledge of the bodies of people killed in Rezallë/Rezala and informed the brigade Command of this. Military documents indicate that the 37th mtbr was responsible also for the clearing up of the battlefield following other crimes in these villages that are described in this Dossier.

According to international law and the instructions given by the Priština Corps at the relevant time, the clearing up of the battlefield involved an extensive procedure entailing identification, burying and making lists of the bodies found, that was carried out together with the civilian authorities. Also, the applicable regulations required the notification of military investigative bodies of any indications that crimes had been committed. However, the available documents and the very fact that the bodies remained hidden in a secret location for 15 years conclusively prove that the bodies of the victims from Rezallë/Rezala, Çikatovë e Vjeter/Staro Čikatovo, Zabel i Ulët/Donji Zabelj and Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo were treated in a manner contrary to the rules of international law.

It should be noted that the Ministry of Defence has denied the HLC access to several documents that are not available in the ICTY Judicial Database, justifying it by stating, among other things, that providing access to the requested documents would be detrimental to the operational and functional capability of the Serbian Army (VS). The requested documents would greatly contribute to a more complete reconstruction of the events depicted in the Dossier.

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During the analysis of the material compiled while writing the Dossier, a large number of individuals were identified who at the very least "knew or had reason to know" that crimes had been committed in the aforementioned villages, as well as individuals who ordered and carried out the removal of the bodies. Most of them are former members of the 37th mtbr, including its then commander and the incumbent Chief of General Staff of the VS, Ljubiša Diković. Finding out what they know about the crimes, along with the examination of witnesses and of the documents the HLC has managed to obtain - and of those stored in the VS archive which the HLC could not obtain - are the first and key steps to an independent and comprehensive investigation aimed at identifying those responsible for the killings in Rezallë/Rezala, Çikatovë e Vjeter/Staro Čikatovo, Zabel i Ulët/Donji Zabelj and Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo, and for keeping the bodies of the victims hidden for 15 years.

III. 'The clearing-up of the battlefield' by the VJ and MUP units during the war in Kosovo

1. The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols prescribe rules of procedure for the treatment



of bodies of dead persons during an armed conflict. A party involved in a conflict is obligated to make, in the shortest possible period of time, a record of all the details which can contribute to the identification of the deceased.⁵ The Conventions and Protocols also require from the states that, before the burial of the dead, a medical examination of the bodies should be performed with the aim of ascertaining death, and identifying the person and the cause of their death.⁶ In addition, parties involved in a conflict are obligated to ensure that the deceased individuals are properly buried, if possible according to the rituals of their confession, and that their graves are respected, decently maintained and marked in a way so that they can always be found.⁷

2. During the war in Kosovo, organized and coordinated actions of finding and removing human bodies from open spaces and facilities were conducted by VJ and MUP units as part of the procedure called 'the clearing-up of the battlefield'. The term 'clearing-up of the battlefield', according to the terminology of the VJ, included taking sanitary- hygienic, sanitary-technical and other necessary measures and activities aimed at finding and collecting or removing dead people and animals, and at removing all things hazardous to the health of humans and animals and harmful to the environment.⁸

3. The actions of the VJ and MUP units which conducted 'clearing-up of the battlefield' operations during the war in Kosovo were contrary to the rules of international law. According to the findings of the ICTY, the VJ and MUP forces conducted coordinated actions with the unlawful purpose of concealing evidence of the crimes committed.⁹

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4. This is corroborated by the fact that, in addition to the evidence of the mass grave in Rudnica, over 900 bodies of Kosovo Albanian civilians have been found in secret locations in mass graves in Serbia, and that another 900 Kosovo Albanians are still reported as missing. In other words, had the VJ and MUP forces acted in accordance with the aforementioned rules, the public and the competent authorities would have been informed by the VJ and MUP immediately after the end of the conflict of the whereabouts of the bodies that were collected during the 'clearing-up' of the battlefield.

5. As the ICTY ascertained in the *Đorđević* judgment, the VJ, either independently or in cooperation with members of the MUP, collected bodies on the ground, which the MUP forces then hid in secret

5 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12th 1949, Article 16; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12th 1949, Article 19.

6 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12th 1949, Article 17; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12th 1949, Article 20; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12th 1949, Article 120.

7 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12th 1949, Article 17; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12th 1949, Article 120; Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12th 1949, Article 130.

8 The Application of the rules of international law of armed conflict, p. 92, ex.no. P01011, *Šainović et al.*

9 To find out more on the concealing of bodies see ICTY Trial judgment in the *Šainović et al.* case rendered on February 26th 2009, p. 428-460, and Trial judgment in the *Đorđević* case rendered on February 23rd 2011, p.474-520.



locations. On the basis of the exhibits presented, the ICTY was unable to establish the participation of the VJ in the operations of transferring bodies to three mass graves in Serbia.¹⁰

6. Vladimir Lazarević, Commander of the Pristina Corps of the VJ (PrC), on March 31st 1999 issued an order for 'clearing up the battlefield' to all commands of brigades deployed in Kosovo, instructing the VJ forces to conduct clear-ups in their areas of responsibility, together with the MUP, "in cooperation with the authorities (military prosecutors, municipal authorities)".¹¹

7. Although according to this document it was ordered that the VJ were to conduct the clearing-up in border areas, and the MUP in the interior, from numerous other military documents as well as the ICTY findings, it is evident that the VJ conducted the clearing-up in the interior of Kosovo as well.¹²

8. According to the order of the PrC dated March 31st 1999, the procedures of the clearing-up were conducted by special units within VJ brigades – a squad, which included, among other persons, the investigative judge, the commander of the squad, a medical technician and a veterinary technician. Regarding technology, the squad had at its disposition two freight cars of two and a half tons. As part of the procedure of clearing-up, the commander of the squad issued the orders and the investigative judge dealt with the professional part of the process.¹³

9. The procedure for dealing with the civilian bodies that the squad would find provided for the delivery of the bodies to the authorities in whose jurisdiction the bodies were found, making the list of persons buried and sketching the burial site. The commander of the squad handed over a copy of the list of buried persons and the sketch of the burial site to the municipal representatives and the registrar. Personal belongings of persons of unknown identity were handed over to the military section or garrison command.¹⁴

10. Acting on orders, the commands of the brigades subordinate to the PrC issued individual orders on the establishment of squads for clearing-up within the brigades.

i. Data of the VJ and MUP on the conducted clearing-up and concealment of bodies

11. In 2001, the VJ and MUP established investigative bodies that dealt with the gathering of

10 The ICTY Trial judgment in the *Dorđević* case rendered on February 23rd 2011, para. 553, 985, 988, 2118, 2119 and 2121; The ICTY Trial judgment in the *Šainović et al.* case rendered on February 26th 2009, Vol. 4, para. 1356 and 1357.

11 Order for the clearing-up of the battlefield given by Pristina Corps, March 31st 1999, ex.no. 5D00352, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 1.

12 Order for the clearing-up of the battlefield by PrC – amendment, April 8th 1999, ex.no. 5D00179, *Šainović et al*; Order for the clearing-up of the battlefield by the Command of the 125th mtbr, April 4th 1999, ex.no. P01246, *Šainović et al*; Order for the clearing-up of the battlefield by the Command of the 37th mtbr, April 5th 1999, ex.no. 5D01028, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 2.

13 Order for the clearing-up of the battlefield by PrC, March 31st 1999, ex.no. 5D00352, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 1.

14 Ibid.



information about the clearing-up of the battlefield and the manner of dealing with the bodies found in the field during the war in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999. The findings of the two bodies were diametrically opposed. While the findings of the body which was formed by the MUP elucidated the circumstances surrounding the participation of high-ranking government officials in the concealment of the bodies of Kosovo Albanians and contributed to the discovery of new sites of mass graves, the findings of the body established by the VJ were that the Army acted in accordance with international and domestic laws.

12. In May 2001, Dušan Mihajlović the then Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, established a working group of the MUP with the task to investigate the case of a refrigerator truck containing bodies found in April 1999 in the Danube, near Tekija (eastern Serbia), which were still unidentified at the time. The members of the working group included among others Dragan Karleuša, Dragan Furdulović, Dragan Mirčić, Bora Banjac and, for some time, Milorad Veljović.¹⁵ According to the findings of the working group, in March 1999 a meeting was held in the office of Slobodan Milošević, which was attended by Milošević himself, as well as by Vlajko Stojiljković (the Minister of the Interior), Vlastimir Đorđević (the Head of the RJB) and Radomir Marković (the Head of the RDB). During the meeting, Đorđević raised the issue of the cleaning of the terrain in Kosovo, which he referred to as the 'clearing-up'. Milošević then ordered Stojiljković to "take measures to eliminate all traces which could point to the existence of evidence of crimes committed."¹⁶ On the basis of the information gathered, the working group established the existence of mass graves containing the bodies of Kosovo Albanians in Batajnica, Perućac and Petrovo Selo.¹⁷

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13. In May 2001, the General Staff of the VJ established a Commission for the collection of materials on executed clear-ups of the battlefield on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. The Chairman of the Commission was Major General Momčilo Krgović, a doctor by profession, and his Deputy was Major General Aco Tomić, at the time the Head of the First Department of the Counterintelligence Service of the VJ.¹⁸

14. The Commission's report states that the VJ units deployed in Kosovo during 1999 in their areas of responsibility conducted the clearing-up of 56 sites, where they found 208 human bodies.¹⁹ In addition, the report states that the VJ exhumed nine mass graves, from which they dug up 203 bodies. Forensic analysis was carried out by the military authorities, but only 76 bodies were identified.²⁰ Among the identified bodies from the nine mentioned mass graves were the bodies of Albanian

15 The ICTY Trial judgment in the *Đorđević* case rendered on February 23rd 2011, Vol. II, para. 1369.

16 Information of the Working group, May 25th 2001, p. 3, ex.no. P00567, *Šainović et al.* See also the ICTY judgment in the case *Šainović et al.* rendered on February 26th 2009, Vol. 2 out of 4, para. 1325.

17 The ICTY Trial judgment in the *Đorđević* case rendered on February 23rd 2011, Vol. II, para.1375. and 1378.

18 Application of rules of international law in armed conflicts, p. 97, ex.no. P01011, *Šainović et al*; Dejan Anastasijević, "Nine lives of one general", *VREME*, issue 698, May 2004.

19 Application of rules of international law in armed conflicts, p. 95, ex.no. P01011, *Šainović et al.*

20 ICRC, Missing persons on the territory of Kosovo in connection with the events from January 1998; June 2014.



civilians murdered in Izbicë/Izbica on March 28th 1999, which were found in the mass grave in Petrovo Selo in 2001.

15. At 13 other sites the VJ found at least 667 bodies, „for which it was determined with certainty that the deaths of these persons were not caused by the activity of members of the VJ“. According to the report, the Commission received the information regarding these bodies from “the security departments of the units which were deployed in Kosovo”, without specifying how this could have been determined with certainty, or whether the military investigative bodies participated in the procedure.²¹

16. 10 out of 13 mentioned sites are located in the region of Drenica, which was in the area of responsibility of the 37th mtbr during 1999. These locations include, among others, Rezallë/Rezala and Çikatovë e Vjeter/Staro Čikatovo, the villages where the civilians whose bodies were found in Rudnica had been executed.

17. In the ICRC Missing Persons Database, 53 persons from the aforementioned 13 sites are still reported as missing in connection with the events of 1999, including 10 persons murdered in Rezallë/Rezala on April 5th 1999.²²

IV. Discovery of the mass grave in Rudnica

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18. According to the available data, the information about the existence of a mass grave in Rudnica emerged during the investigation into the case of the “Drenica Group”, which was conducted before the District Court in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica.²³ A witness, who was later on charged with the commission of a crime in the indictment raised in that case, indicated that in 1999 the bodies of Albanians murdered during the war in Kosovo were brought to the old quarry in Rudnica, and that later on that site was covered up with dirt and partially paved.²⁴


21 Application of rules of international law in armed conflicts, p. 111, ex.no. P01011, Šainović *et al.*

22 ICRC, Missing persons on the territory of Kosovo in connection with the events from January 1998, June 2014.

23 The case of Prosecutor against Ismet Haxha and others was conducted before the District court in Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica in the period from April 22nd to May 29th 2014 when the trial judgment was pronounced by which the defendants Ismet Haxha, Shefki Hyseni, Nexhat Qubrelj and Sulejman Selimi were freed of charges of war crime against civilian population, committed against Albanian civilians in Kosovo.

24 Closing arguments of the counsellor Bajram Tmava on May 26th 2014 in the case “Drenica group”. See also Zoran Kusanović, Suspected mass grave excavated in Serbia, *Al Jazeera*, available in Serbian at <http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/pocelo-iskopavanje-masovne-grobnice-u-srbiji>, accessed in August 2014.





19. The investigating authorities of the Republic of Serbia searched the locations in the quarry in Rudnica for the first time in 2007, and then in 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2014.²⁵ The first mortal remains were found on December 13th 2013.²⁶

20. The OWCP, in its first statement regarding the mass grave in Rudnica in May 2010, stated that it is suspected that the bodies are those of 250 Kosovo Albanians.²⁷ In the following statement, the OWCP specified that the mortal remains in Rudnica are “mortal remains brought from primary graves in the area of Drenica in Kosovo.”²⁸ Finally, DNA analysis conducted in April 2014 confirmed that the mortal

25 Press release of the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor, the Fourth order on the investigation of the location “Rudnica”, August 6th 2014, available in Serbian at http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/VESTI_SAOPSTENJA_2014/V_S_2014_08_06_CIR.pdf accessed on August 22nd 2014.

26 Zana Cimili, „Remains found in Rudnica”, B92, available in Serbian at http://www.b92.net/video/vesti.php?yyyy=2013&mm=12&dd=13&nav_id=788968, accessed on August 27th 2014.

27 Press release of the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor, May 10th 2010, available in Serbian at http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/VESTI_SAOPSTENJA_2010/V_S_2010_05_10_LAT.PDF, accessed on August 27th 2014.

28 Press release of the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor, Proposed investigative actions regarding the potential mass grave in Raška, May 18th 2010, available in Serbian at http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/VESTI_SAOPSTENJA_2010/V_S_2010_05_18_LAT.PDF, accessed on August 27th 2014.



remains found in Rudnica are those of Kosovo Albanians murdered during the war in Kosovo in the area of Drenica.²⁹

21. According to the statement made by Veljko Odalović, the Chairman of the Commission for Missing Persons of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, the excavations in Rudnica were terminated on August 22nd 2014, but will be continued “in the case of any serious information and valid evidence.”³⁰ At the time of the publication of this Dossier, the excavations in Rudnica have not been resumed.

V. The site of the grave

22. Rudnica village is located in Raska municipality, in southern Serbia. The mass grave is located in an abandoned quarry, about 10 metres from the regional motorway between Raska and Leposaviq/Leposavić, in the vicinity of the border-crossing at Jarinje, between Serbia and Kosovo.³¹

23. The site of the mass grave is about 80km away from Rezallë/Rezala, 95km from Çikatovë e Vjeter/Staro Čikatovo, 100km from Zabel i Ulët/Donji Zabel and about 100km from Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo.

24. The mass grave is located in the immediate vicinity of the „Rudnica“ barracks built by the VJ. These are two neighboring lots of land separated by the cliff of the quarry. The distance between the barracks and the grave site is about 5 metres as the crow flies (see Photo 1).

25. According to research by the HLC, the land on which the mass grave was discovered in Rudnica belongs to the „Kosmetput“ company, which was set up in February 1999, with its central office in the village of Lešak (Municipality of Leposaviq/Leposavić).³² „Kosmetput“ registered the branch in Rudnica at the Agency for Business Registers.³³

29 Amra Zejneli, „Remains from Rudnica transported to Kosovo“, *Radio Free Europe*, available in Serbian at <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/posmrtni-ostaci-iz-masovne-grobnice-stizu-na-kosovo/26544784.html> accessed on August 22nd 2014.

30 Ibid.

31 The border-crossing at Jarinje is the only official crossing between Serbia and Kosovo, which connects the northern part of Kosovo (municipalities of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, Leposaviq/Leposavić, Zubin Potok) with the south of Serbia.

32 Politika Online, “Bodies of six Albanians excavated in Rudnica“, April 9 2014, available in Serbian at <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Hronika/U-Rudnici-iskopano-tela-sest-Albanaca.lt.html>; Agency for Business Registers, search of businesses, accessed on June 17th 2014, <http://pretraga2.apr.gov.rs/EnterprisePublicSearch/Details/EnterpriseBusinessData/1094450?code=576E769D8FCA438FB466A0F94432596433D2DF4E>.

33 Agency for Business Registers, search of businesses, accessed on June 17th 2014, <http://pretraga2.apr.gov.rs/EnterprisePublicSearch/Details/EnterpriseBranchOffices/1094450?code=576E769D8FCA438FB466A0F94432596433D2DF4E>.



26. An investigator from the HLC spoke with two authorized individuals employed in the „Kosmetput“ company. According to them, at the beginning of 1999 „Kosmetput“ bought a lot of 50 acres in Rudnica from the „Megalit Raška“ company. There were no buildings on the purchased land. In May 1999, „Kosmetput“ built an administrative building (the excavations of the mass grave were carried out underneath this building). Both individuals explicitly stated that the mortal remains were not found underneath the administrative building, but were located in the parking lot which is in front of the building where the machinery is kept. They were aware that excavations have been conducted since 2007, but they claim that they received the order for the transfer of machinery only in the autumn of 2013, since when they have had no access to the administrative building and other facilities. During the excavations the administrative building was taken down.³⁴

27. The HLC contacted a representative of the „Megalit Raška“ company, who confirmed that at the beginning of 1999 this company sold about 50 acres of land in Rudnica to the „Kosmetput“ company. The land was sold by the order of the Serbian government at that time, because Kosmetput had to move the mechanization from Kosovo to Serbia.³⁵

28. The military barracks located next to the quarry where the mass grave was found is situated on the land lot which also belonged to the „Megalit Raška“ company. According to the representative of „Megalit Raška“, before the year 1999 this company conceded a few hectares of its land in Rudnica to the VJ, which later built the barracks there (see Photo 1).³⁶

29. The HLC investigators established that the facilities of the barracks at „Rudnica“ are now used by the Gendarmery of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia.

30. On June 13th 2014, the HLC sent a request for access to information of public importance to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, in which it requested the Ministry to provide the information when the Rudnica barracks was formed, who was its head, whether the barracks still exists and, if so, who is its head now, as well as the contract by which the „Megalit Raška“ company conceded its land to the VJ.³⁷

31. In reply to the HLC, the Ministry of Defence stated that the barracks was „put into operation in 2002“ and that „the personnel who were engaged in securing the administrative border with Kosovo and Metohija were accommodated there“. It also stated that the barracks did not have a specific commander and that in 2006 it was conceded to the MUP. In its reply, the Ministry also pointed out

34 Record of the phone conversation between the HLC investigator with a D.V. - authorized individual from Kosmetput, on June 11th 2014.

35 Record of the conversation with B. B. on June 12th 2014.

36 Ibid.

37 The Ministry of Defence, Request for access to information of public importance, HlcIndexOut:170-F95489 on June 13th 2014.



that “a photocopy of the contract by which the Megalit Raška company conceded the land on which the military barracks was built to the VJ could not be found.”³⁸

VI. Exhumation and identification of bodies

32. To date, the mortal remains of 52 persons have been exhumed from the mass grave in Rudnica.³⁹ Although excavations were conducted at three sites in Rudnica, all of the bodies were exhumed from one site – in the immediate vicinity of the administrative building of a branch of the „Kosmetput“ company.⁴⁰

33. According to the data of the Office for Missing Persons of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, a total of 52 bodies have been identified: 27 bodies of civilians murdered in Rezallë/Rezala (Municipality of Skënderaj/Srbica); 20 bodies of civilians killed in Çikatovë e Vjeter/Staro Čikatovo (Municipality of Glllogoc/Glogovac); four bodies of civilians killed in Zabel i Ulët/Donji Zabelj (Municipality of Glllogoc/Glogovac) and one body of a civilian killed in Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo (Municipality of Glllogoc/Glogovac).⁴¹

34. The Commission for Missing Persons of the Government of the Republic of Serbia has not publicly communicated the exact number nor the identity of the persons found in the mass grave in Rudnica, and the HLC's request for information on the identity of exhumed victims was denied by the Commission, on the grounds that the exhumation procedure is under the jurisdiction of the Higher Court in Belgrade.⁴²

35. On August 22nd 2014, the competent authorities of the Republic of Serbia handed over the mortal remains of 16 persons to EULEX at the border crossing at Merdare.⁴³ Following that, on September 12th 2014 the mortal remains of 24 persons were handed over,⁴⁴ and the remaining 12 bodies on October 13th 2014.⁴⁵

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38 Reply of the Ministry of Defence to the request for access to information of public importance HLC no: 559-4/14 on July 28th 2014.

39 Press release of the Office of War Crimes Prosecutor, the fourth order on the investigation of the “Rudnica” location, August 6th 2014, available in Serbian at http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/VESTI_SAOPSTENJA_2014/VS_2014_08_06_CIR.pdf accessed on August 22nd 2014.

40 Zoran Kosanović, EULEX, collected the mortal remains from Rudnica, *Al Jazeera*, available in Serbian at <http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/eulex-preuzeo-tijela-ubijenih-iz-rudnice>, accessed on August 27th 2014.

41 Data of the Office for Missing Persons of the Government of Republic of Kosovo, emails sent on: August 26th 2014, September 14th 2014 and October 15th 2014.

42 The reply of the Commission for Missing Persons of the Government of Republic of Serbia no.021-01-01/2014-01/ on September 23rd 2014.

43 Amra Zejneli, „Remains from Rudnica transported to Kosovo“, *Radio Free Europe*, available in Serbian at <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/posmrtni-ostaci-iz-masovne-grobnice-stizu-na-kosovo/26544784.html> accessed on August 22nd 2014.

44 Marija Ristić, EULEX, collected the mortal remains of 24 victims from the grave in Rudnica, *Balkan Insight*, September 15th 2014, available in Serbian at <http://www.balkaninsight.com/rs/article/euleks-preuzeo-ostatke-24-C5%Bertve-iz-grobnice-u-rudnici> accessed on September 16th 2014.

45 “The handover of the remains at Merdare“, *Radio Kosovo and Metohija*, October 13th 2014, available in Serbian at <http://www.radiokim.net/vesti/hronika/primopredaja-posmrtnih-ostataka-na-merdaru.html> accessed on October 17th 2014.



VII. Crimes in which the civilians whose bodies were found in Rudnica had been killed

36. All the persons whose bodies were found in Rudnica were civilians, who were either killed or forcibly disappeared in four separate crimes committed by members of the VJ and the MUP during April and May in 1999 in the region of Drenica (the region in central Kosovo including the municipalities of Skënderaj/Srbica and Glogoc/Glogovac).

1. The murder of at least 41 civilians in Rezallë/Rezala

37. The village of Rezallë/Rezala is located around 7km south from the town of Skënderaj/Srbica. Based on the evidence obtained, the HLC has determined that **on April 5th 1999** the members of the VJ and MUP drove the citizens of the village of Rezallë/Rezala out of their houses and then killed **at least 41 Albanian civilians**, 39 of whom in one mass execution. The members of the VJ covered the bodies of the murdered persons with earth. 27 out of the 41 bodies of victims who had been killed in Rezallë/Rezala were found in the mass grave at Rudnica, and 10 victims are still reported as missing.

38. The evidence leads to the conclusion that the crime in Rezallë/Rezala was committed as part of an operation of military-police forces under the command of the 37th mtbr. Members of the 37th mtbr and for now unidentified units of the MUP participated in the crime. The bodies of those killed in this crime remained in Rezallë/Rezala under the control of the 37th mtbr until April 13th, when they were transported by a truck to an unknown direction.

1.1. Description of events based on witness statements

39. On April 5th 1999, around 9 a.m., members of the Serbian forces accompanied by tanks and armored vehicles entered Rezallë/Rezala coming from the direction of the villages of Morinë/Morina and Likoc/Likovac (Municipality of Skënderaj/Srbica).⁴⁶ Shortly afterwards, members of the Serbian forces dressed in green and blue camouflage uniforms, some wearing helmets and some wearing hats, and with white armbands, began to enter Albanian houses and ordering the villagers and the refugees in the village to gather at the village primary school in the village center.⁴⁷ While leaving the house, an elderly villager was shot in the head, before the eyes of his family.⁴⁸

40. When a few hundred villagers had gathered at the school, the members of the Serbian forces ordered them to enter the backyard of a nearby house which belonged to Hashim Derguti.⁴⁹ They were

46 HLC database: statement of witness T.D. given to HLC, November 2000; statement of witness S.K given to HLC, August 2010.

47 HLC database: statement of witness V.D. given to HLC, November 2000; statement of witness H.Z. given to HLC, November 2000; statement of witness I.R. given to FHP, November 2000; statement of witness V.R. given to HLC, November 2000; statement of witness M.D. given to HLC, November 2000.

48 HLC database: statement of witness S. Z. given to HLC, July 2007.

49 Ibid.



ordered to sit on the ground. The members of the Serbian forces searched them and confiscated their money, jewelry and other valuables. Occasionally, while looting the valuables, they beat the men with rifle butts, with their wives, children and other family members standing by.⁵⁰

41. At around 5 p.m., the members of the Serbian forces (whom the witnesses identified as police officers)⁵¹ who were keeping the civilians in Hashim Derguti's backyard left the backyard and went to the village of Likoc/Likovac; whereupon the backyard was entered by a larger group of members of the Serbian forces that one survivor described as younger members of the VJ, who had arrived at the site in a few trucks.⁵² They ordered the women and children to leave the backyard and head for the neighboring village of Makërmal/Makrmalj.

42. According to the survivors' statements, when the women and children had left, the Serbian forces ordered the men to stand in a column two by two, and then took them 50m away from the house, near to the village cemetery. In that place, they were lined up along the fence, so that they were facing the members of the Serbian forces. The members of the Serbian forces drove tractors which were making a lot of noise around the detained men.⁵³ After a few minutes, the men were shot at, first with a machine-gun which had been set up on the first floor of Hashim Derguti's house, and then with the automatic rifles of the members of the Serbian forces facing the men. After about ten minutes, the members of the Serbian forces approached the executed men to check whether they were all dead. Those who were still alive were then killed with further bursts from rifles.⁵⁴

43. The members of the Serbian forces killed 39 civilians on the spot, while two survived the shooting because they were covered by the bodies of men that had fallen on top of them. Among the killed civilians there were three boys, whilst the oldest victim was 97 years old.⁵⁵ At least two more civilians were killed in the nearby forest.⁵⁶

44. The bodies of the executed civilians remained at the scene of the crime. The following day, April 6th 1999, the soldiers came back to the village and covered the bodies with earth.⁵⁷ Approximately one week later, the soldiers came back to the village, dug up the bodies, loaded them into a truck and then drove with them in the direction of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica.⁵⁸

45. The mortal remains of 27 civilians shot in Rezallë/Rezala were found in Rudnica mass grave: **Burim** (Xhemajl) **Zabeli** (1987), **Besim** (Skender) **Rukolli** (1983), **Perparim** (Uke) **Hoti** (1983),

50 Ibid.

51 HLC database: statement of witness H. Z. given to HLC, November 2000.

52 HLC database: statement of witness I.R. given to HLC, November 2000.

53 Ibid, HLC database: statement of witness M.D. given to HLC, November 2000.

54 HLC database: statement of witness I.R. given to HLC, November 2000.

55 Ibid.

56 HLC database: statement of witness S. K. given to HLC, August 2010; statement of witness V. A. given to HLC, July 2007.

57 HLC database: statement of witness M.D. given to HLC, November 2000.

58 Ibid.



Jahë (Kamer) **Rukolli** (1981), **Blerim** (Beqir) **Dobruna** (1979), **Abdullah** (Tafe) **Rukolli** (1961), **Isuf** (Rexhep) **Aruqi** (1955), **Jahë** (Rexhep) **Aruqi** (1952), **Demir** (Halil) **Deliu** (1952), **Demir** (Sheqir) **Rukolli** (1952), **Xhemajl** (Haxhi) **Zabeli** (1949), **Vesel** (Osman) **Deliu** (1948), **Ilaz** (Bajram) **Rukolli** (1946), **Azem** (Bejte) **Hoti** (1945), **Behram** (Hetem) **Rukolli** (1943), **Latif** (Ymer) **Zabeli** (1942), **Alush** (Maliq) **Hoti** (1941), **Ukë** (Bejte) **Hoti** (1939), **Shaban** (Sokol) **Aliu** (1939), **Zymer** (Sinan) **Rukolli** (1937), **Bajram** (Zeqir) **Ahmeti** (1936), **Nehbi** (Mehmet) **Kodra** (1935), **Adem** (Osman) **Deliu** (1934), **Aziz** (Ibrahim) **Deliu** (1934), **Sadik** (Zymer) **Mala** (1931), **Rexhep** (Osman) **Rukolli** (1924) and **Mehmet** (Kadri) **Zabeli** (1916).⁵⁹

46. The bodies of 10 victims have not been found to date and their disappearance is registered on the list of the ICRC: **Nazif** (Avdyl) **Hoti** (1950), **Hetem** (Osman) **Deliu** (1945), **Rexhep** (Fejza) **Hoti** (1934), **Sadri** (Jakup) **Zabeli** (1933), **Nezir** (Shaban) **Deliu** (1932), **Dibran** (Hetem) **Rukolli** (1932), **Hysen** (Beke) **Aruqi** (1927), **Jonuz** (Halil) **Rukolli** (1918), **Hajdar** (H) **Zabeli** (1915) and **Shefqet** (Kadri) **Zabeli** (1912).⁶⁰

47. The mortal remains of **Isuf** (Ibrahim) **Rukolli** (1957) and **Isa** (Mursel) **Zabeli** (1933), who were executed with the other civilians, were found after the war in the Derguti family cemetery in Rezallë/Rezala.⁶¹

1.2. Other sources

22 48. The killings of the citizens and refugees in the village of Rezallë/Rezala and the removal of their bodies were also documented by journalists of The Guardian and the Human Rights Watch.⁶²

1.3. Military documents and testimonies of VJ officers

49. According to the official military documents, on the day of the crime in Rezallë/Rezala (April 5th, 1999), in the wider region of Gornja Drenica, which includes Rezallë/Rezala village, Serbian forces conducted an operation under the command of the 37th mtbr. Military documents and statements given by officers of this brigade point to the fact that members of the 37th mtbr in cooperation with a still unidentified MUP unit participated in the commission of the crime in Rezallë/Rezala. The bodies of the killed were under the jurisdiction of the Clearing-up Squad of the 37th mtbr at least until April 13th 1999.

59 Data of the Office for Missing Persons of the Government of Republic of Kosovo, emails sent on: August 26th 2014, September 14th 2014 and October 15th 2014.

60 ICRC, Missing persons on the territory of Kosovo in connection with the events from January 1998, June 2014.

61 HLC database: statement of witness S. R. given to HLC, July 2007; statement from witness S. Z. given to HLC, July 2007.

62 Julian Borger, Owen Bowcott, „Troops covered up massacres“, *The Guardian*, June 17th 1999 available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jun/17/balkans6> accessed on December 16th 2014; Human Rights Watch, *Under orders*, available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/kosovo/> accessed on December 26th 2014.



1.3.1. Mobilization and arrival of the 37th mtbr in Drenica

50. The first part of the 37th mtbr came to the region of Drenica in early March 1999 on the orders of the Command of the Užice Corps of the Second Army of the VJ.⁶³ The document of the Pristina Corps Command of the VJ dated March 28th 1999 confirms that the 37th mtbr at that time was already conducting operations in Drenica and requires bringing the rest of the brigade to Drenica. In the document, the 37th mtbr is required to: „secure communications between Skënderaj/Srbica- Glllogoc/Glogovac and Skënderaj/Srbica- Klinë/Klina and full combat control of the territory.“⁶⁴ Rezallë/Rezala village is located in the midst of the communication line – the routes of Skënderaj/Srbica – Glllogoc/Glogovac and Skënderaj/Srbica – Klinë/Klina (see Map 1).

51. The 37th mtbr of the VJ reported on the implementation of this order in the combat report on March 30th 1999, where it is stated that the units of this brigade took control of „facilities suitable for the control of territory and roads that go from Glllogoc/Glogovac and Klinë/Klina to Skënderaj/Srbica and Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica“.⁶⁵

52. On **April 1st, 1999 at 10 pm**, the Command of the 37th mtbr issued a marching order, in which the 37th mtbr is instructed to occupy the area that includes Rezallë/Rezala:

“Execute the march [...] to reach the marching destination in the region of Srbica [Skënderaj], deploy units around the area, with the following objective: upon completion of the march and occupation of the region [...] deliver control of the wider area of Drenica [...] Likovac [Likoc], *Rezala* [Rezallë]...”⁶⁶ [italics added by HLC]

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53. It was not the entire 37th mtbr that participated in the aforementioned march, but only 12 of its units.⁶⁷ On the following day, the commander of the PrC, Vladimir Lazarević, committed additional forces of the 37th mtbr to that area. **On April 2nd 1999**, the Priština Corps Command issued an order for the engagement of the 37th mtbr, which provided for the following to be carried out upon the completion of the mobilization: „by applying strong action crush and destroy the SHTF in the area as soon as possible, secure main transportation routes [Skënderaj/Srbica – Glllogoc/Glogovac and Skënderaj/Srbica – Klinë/Klina – author’s note] and secure full combat control of the territory”(see Map 1).⁶⁸

63 Testimony of Ljubiša Diković on December 10th 2007 in the *Šainović et al.* case, p. 19870.

64 Preparatory order of the Priština Corps on March 28th 1999, ex.no. 5D00339, *Šainović et al.*

65 Regular combat report of the 37th mtbr on March 30th 1999, ex.no. P02049, *Šainović et al.*

66 Marching order, operational number 110.1, from April 1st 1999, ex.no. 5D01027, *Šainović et al.*

67 The units of the 37th mtbr that participated in the march are the following: reconnaissance troops, liaison troops, the 1st company of the 1st Motorized Battalion, military police detachment, self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, tank company, artillery battery of anti-air defence, the 1st Motorized Battalion without the 3rd Company, the 3rd Company of the 1st Motorized Battalion, the howitzer artillery battalion, the artillery rocket battalion of anti-aircraft defence and the S-2M missile battery of anti-aircraft defence.

68 The 37th mtbr conducted this operation in cooperation with the 252nd okbr and the 15th okbr and the MUP units. See order for engagement of the 37th mtbr from April 2nd 1999, ex.no.P02030, *Šainović et al.*



Map 1

54. In the regular daily combat report of the 37th mtbr, dated **April 3rd 1999**, the Commander of the 37th mtbr, Ljubiša Diković, notified the Priština Corps that during the day „the reception and deployment of the rest of the mobilized forces has been executed“.⁶⁹

55. During the testimony of Ljubiša Diković in the *Šainović et al.* case, the Prosecutor in that case pointed out that „there is a gap of available documents from 30th of March until the 19th of April, 1999“ relating to the operations of the 37th mtbr. Therefore, the Prosecutor asked Diković what his brigade was actually doing in this period:

An excerpt from the cross-examination of Ljubiša Diković

Diković: “Between the 30th of March and 19th of April, the focus was on the implementation of the following tasks. The remaining part, the best part of the 37th Motorised Brigade was received and deployed, and the Drenica sector was occupied. The defence sector was occupied.”

Prosecutor Carter (PC): „Can you please tell me when the remainder of your brigade arrived, what was the manpower available?”

Diković: „The numerical strength of my unit was about 4,500 men.”

PC: „You already had six tanks when you first came with the smaller group. Did any further tanks of heavy weaponry enter on the 2nd of April?”

Diković: „Yes, yes, yes. That’s right. The entire brigade arrived.”

[...]

PC: „ So now you’ve indicated that until the 19th of April you were deploying and occupying that sector [Drenica]. What was happening? You were just going into your post and sitting there or were operations continuing?”

56. In the answer to this question Diković vaguely told the court about how they had to secure the area from “terrorists”, and in the end he said: „we were engaging the terrorists whenever we came across them.”⁷⁰

57. During the research for this Dossier, the HLC sent two requests for information of public importance to the Ministry of Defence, in which it asked for access to the combat reports of the 37th mtbr from April 5th and 6th, which should contain the activities of the brigade on the day of the crime in Rezallë/Rezala.

69 Combat report of the 37th mtbr from April 3rd 1999, ex.no. P02807, *Šainović et al.*

70 Testimony of Ljubiša Diković in the *Šainović et al.* case on December 11th 2007, p.20001-20003.



58. **The Ministry of Defence has refused to provide the combat reports of the 37th mtbr from April 5th and 6th,** citing confidentiality of data and pointing out that provision of the requested data „would inflict damage to the operational and functional capability of the Army, as well as to the interests of the defence of the Republic of Serbia, which outweigh the interests of free access to information of public importance.”⁷¹ In its reply, the Ministry did not, however, present arguments which support the claim that examination of the requested documents would create the abovementioned consequences, although according to the Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance, the Ministry is obliged to provide supporting arguments when rejecting a request. The HLC has filed two appeals to the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance, and at the time of publication of this report has yet to receive the decision of the Commissioner.

1.3.2. Action conducted by the 37th mtbr and the MUP in Drenica on April 5th 1999

59. On **April 4th 1999**, the Commander of the 37th mtbr Ljubiša Diković issued an **Order to destroy SHTF and take combat control of the territory**, which engaged this brigade in a wider operation in the area including the municipalities of Skënderaj/Srbica, Gllogoc/Glogovac, Vushtrri/Vučitrn and Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, starting on April 5th 1999. More precisely, that area stretched from the village of Obrinje and the town of Gllogoc/Glogovac in the south to Vushtrri/Vučitrn and Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica in the north. The village of Rezallë/Rezala is situated (looking from south to north) on the rim of the left border of the territory where the mentioned operation was conducted. **The action was to be launched at 9 a.m. on April 5th 1999.**⁷²

60. Infantry, armor and artillery formations of the 37th mtbr, and still unidentified police formations (see paras. 68-71), were engaged in this action. Of these, three infantry formations and one artillery formation of the 37th mtbr executed tasks in Rezallë/Rezala or in its immediate vicinity (see Map 2).⁷³

61. **The 2nd Motorized Battalion of the 37th mtbr was operational in Rezallë/Rezala**, under the command of Dejan Randelović, equipped with tanks and armored vehicles. One company of this battalion, together with members of the police and with the support of artillery of the 37th mtbr was to „block, search for, smash and destroy SHTF“ in the part of Rezallë/Rezala named *Delijaj mahala*, in which, according to witnesses, civilians were forcibly taken from houses and brought to Hashim Derguti's backyard, and in the end were executed (See Map 2).⁷⁴


71 The reply of the Ministry of Defence to the request for access to information of public importance, July 31st 2014, no. 553 – 6/14; the reply of the Ministry of Defence to the request for access to information of public importance, November 17th 2014, no. 958 – 4/14.

72 The Order of the Commander of the 37th mtbr to destroy the SHTF and take combat control of the territory from April 4th 1999, ex.no. P02813, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 3.

73 Ibid.

74 See the Order of the Commander of the 37th mtbr to destroy the SHTF and take combat control of the territory from April 4th 1999, ex.no. P02813, item 4.1.1, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 3.





Map 2

62. Two other infantry units of the 37th mtbr operated in the immediate vicinity of Rezallë/Rezala on April 5th 1999. The 1st Motorized Battalion of the 37th mtbr led the attack on the village of Krstač located less than 500 m away from Rezallë/Rezala. The 37th Anti-aircraft Battalion was engaged in „blocking, searching for, smashing and destroying SHTF along the k660 – Dević axis“.⁷⁵ Ground level 660 is located about 500 m away from Rezallë/Rezala, while the village of Dević is located about 1.5 km away from Rezallë/Rezala (see Map 2).

63. The brigade artillery group of the 37th mtbr was positioned at a location 1.5 km away from Rezallë/Rezala.⁷⁶

64. The fact that the 37th mtbr undertook military operations in Rezallë/Rezala on the date in question was confirmed by the members of this brigade, Majors Danilo Simonović and Goran Petrović, and Captain 1st Class, Slobodan Radenković, who stated in an interview for “Vojska” magazine that **from April 3rd 1999** in the area of Drenica they conducted a number of actions against the „Albanian terrorist forces: first in the line of villages Kruševac - Devička šuma - Novo Poljance – Trstenik – **Rezala** – Gornje Obrinje“ [italics added by HLC]. In the same article, members of the 37th mtbr clarify that the operations that this unit conducted in Drenica during 1999 also implied the operations of „village cleansing“.⁷⁷

65. Furthermore, in the magazine Vojska, in the article on the operations conducted by the 37th mtbr in Drenica during 1999, it is stated that „the armored battalion under the command of Captain 1st Class Goran Jovanović entered with its steel monsters into enemy strongholds such as Likošan, Likovac, **Rezala** and Bradići“⁷⁸ [italics added by HLC].

1.3.3. Other police and military units that were engaged in the action on April 5th 1999

66. According to the available documentation of the VJ, on the day in question the 37th mtbr conducted the action in Drenica in coordination with the 252nd okbr, 15th okbr, and 7th pbr, and the MUP units.⁷⁹

67. According to the orders of the Commander of the 37th mtbr and other military documents, the other three brigades - the 252nd okbr, the 15th okbr and the 7th pbr - did not conduct activities in the area of responsibility of this brigade (37th mtbr), which includes the village of Rezallë/Rezala. More precisely, the 252nd okbr and the 7th okbr conducted activities on the territory which was to the right of the area of responsibility of the 37th mtbr, and the 15th okbr conducted activities on the territory which

75 Ibid, item 4.1.7.

76 Ibid, item 4.1.5.

77 Article, „Vojska“, „Brave men of Drenica, heroes of defence“, pp.11-13, July 15th 1999.

78 Article, Vojska, „An example to generations“, pp.9-13, July 15th 1999.

79 See the Order of the Commander of the 37th mtbr to destroy the SHTF and take combat control of the territory from April 4th 1999, ex.no. P02813, item 3 and item 7, Šainović et al, Appendix 3.



is to the left and in front of the area of responsibility of the 37th mtbr.⁸⁰

68. Descriptions of the uniforms of the police forces that participated in the attack on Rezallë/Rezala, which were provided by witnesses, as well as the findings of the ICTY on the equipment, uniforms and positions of police forces in Kosovo, indicate that these were probably members of the Special Operations Unit (*Serb.-JSO*) or Special Police Units (*Serb.-PJP*). According to the findings of the ICTY, the scarves, masks and hats that the witnesses described were characteristic of the JSO;⁸¹ however, members of the PJP during 1999 often did not wear their standard uniforms, but could be identified or recognized by their advanced equipment.⁸² Likewise, the ICTY found that both formations used armored personnel carriers (APCs)⁸³ and that both units conducted operations in the Drenica region during 1999.⁸⁴ However, it is more likely that the PJP participated in the operation in Rezallë/Rezala, since the minutes of the meeting of the police leadership in Kosovo dated April 4th 1999 confirm that PJP units were engaged in the Drenica region.⁸⁵ In addition, the commander of the 37th mtbr in his order dated April 4th 1999, describes the present MUP forces in the brigade's area of responsibility by stating that in strength they range "from a squad to a company", which represents the organizational structure of the PJP, not the JSO.⁸⁶

69. In addition, according to the testimony of Ljubiša Diković, the 37th mtbr was joined by 100 - 150 volunteers after April 2nd 1999.⁸⁷ They were deployed within the 37th mtbr units and, according to the testimony of the commander of this brigade, they had the same status as any other member of the 37th mtbr.⁸⁸ The Trial Chamber of the ICTY, in the judgment *Šainović et al.*, found that the volunteers in the VJ "would sometimes wear VJ uniforms along with non-standard apparel such as hats and masks."⁸⁹

70. According to the orders of the Commander of the 37th mtbr given on April 4th 1999, the MUP forces were deployed throughout the Municipalities of Skënderaj/Srbica and Glllogoc/Glogovac, mostly along the routes Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica - Skënderaj/Srbica and Klinë/Klina - Skënderaj/Srbica - Glllogoc/Glogovac. In the aforementioned orders, there are 15 villages mentioned where the MUP forces were stationed. The village of Rezallë/Rezala was not among them.⁹⁰

80 Ibid, item 3.

81 ICTY Trial judgment in the *Dorđević* case rendered on February 23rd 2011, Vol.I, para. 85.

82 Ibid, para. 66.

83 Ibid, para. 87 and 66.

84 Ibid, para. 84.

85 Minutes of the meeting with the leadership of the police in Kosovo from April 4th 1999, ex.no. P00764, *Dorđević*.

86 See the Order of the Commander of the 37th mtbr to destroy the SHTF and take combat control of the territory from April 4th 1999, ex.no. P02813, item 3, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 3.

87 Testimony of Ljubiša Diković from December 11th 2007 in the *Šainović et al.* case, p. 19994.

88 Ibid, pp. 19987-19988.

89 ICTY judgment in the *Šainović et al.* case rendered on February 26th 2009, Vol. 2, para. 54.

90 See the Order of the Commander of the 37th mtbr to destroy the SHTF and take combat control of the territory from April 4th 1999, ex.no. P02813, item 3, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 3.



71. The 35th detachment of the PJP conducted activities in two villages (Kushtovë/Košutovo and Broboniq/Brabonjić) which are located 5 and 10km, respectively, north of Rezallë/Rezala.⁹¹

1.3.4. The bodies of victims in the jurisdiction of the Clearing-up Squad of the 37th mtbr

72. The bodies of victims killed in the mass crime in Rezallë/Rezala, immediately after the commission of the crime and up until April 13th 1999 were under the jurisdiction of the Squad of the 37th mtbr for the clearing-up of the battlefield. Based on the available documents, it is not possible to reconstruct how this squad dealt with the bodies after this date, or whether the command of the 37th mtbr informed the military investigative authorities about the crimes.

73. The Commander of the 37th mtbr, Ljubiša Diković, issued an order for 'clearing-up the battlefield' on April 5th 1999 - the day of the crime in Rezallë/Rezala, or more precisely „for finding and collecting human... corpses [and] their burial“. In order to execute this task, and in accordance with the order issued by the Priština Corps dated March 31st, 1999 (see paras. 6-9), a squad was formed which, among other things, had the following responsibilities: „to collect data on where bodies of the SHTF were found, report on these locations to the Chief of MUP Srbica [Skënderaj]; upon receiving such reports, the latter, via the Chief of MUP Kosovska Mitrovica [Mitrovicë], will regulate the engagement of personnel for collection, burial, clearing up operations and the prescribed records on persons buried.“ Captain 1st Class Rade Krsmanović was appointed Commander of this Squad, and Major Hasan Čorbić was appointed his Deputy.⁹²

74. In the same order, the Squad for clearing-up was ordered to report to the Command of the Brigade „daily on implementation of this order during the daily briefing, and at other times as needed“. ⁹³ Subsequent orders issued by the Commander of the 37th mtbr confirm that Brigade Commander Ljubiša Diković was familiar with the clearing-up performed in his area of responsibility.⁹⁴

75. The order also contains one very surprising assumption of the Commander of the 37th mtbr - that all of the bodies that the Squad comes across will be the bodies of the “SHTF” although the term ‘clearing-up of the battlefield’ implies finding and burying the bodies of civilians as well as combatants.⁹⁵ This order is especially revealing, if one takes into consideration available orders of other VJ brigades on clearing up the battlefield, for example of the 125th mtbr. According to this order, the command of the 125th mtbr does not anticipate what bodies will be found, but issues a clear task

91 Minutes of the meeting with the leadership of the police in Kosovo from April 4th 1999, ex.no. P00764, *Dorđević*; Order of the Commander of the 37th mtbr to destroy the SHTF and take combat control of the territory from April 4th 1999, ex.no. P02813, item 3 *Šainović et al*, Appendix 3.

92 Order for the clearing-up of the battlefield of the 37th mtbr, April 5th 1999, ex.no. 5D01028, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 2.

93 Ibid.

94 See for example: Order in connection with the meeting on the clearing-up of the battlefield from April 30th 1999, ex.no. 5D01035, *Šainović et al*.

95 Order for the clearing-up of the battlefield of the 37th mtbr, April 5th 1999, ex.no. 5D01028, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 2.



to members of the squad that they remove all dead bodies that they come across, in accordance with the instructions given.⁹⁶

76. On April 13th, 1999, the Commander of the Clearing-up Squad of the 37th mtbr, Rade Krsmanović, and his Deputy Hasan Čorbić, notified the Secretariat for Internal Affairs (SUP) in Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica „that there are 30-40 bodies in Rezala [Rezallë] village near the village cemetery that had been covered by dirt and rubble *by members of the Yugoslav Army*“ [italics added by HLC].⁹⁷

77. Upon arrival at the scene of the crime on April 13th, 1999, the investigative judge of the District Court in Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica, Bogoljub Paunović, with the participation of officials from the SUP Mitrovicë/Kosovska Mitrovica, established that near the village cemetery in Rezallë/Rezala there was a layer of soil, and that by removing the first layer of the soil there was evidence of the presence of human bodies.⁹⁸

78. The investigative judge refused to issue an order for exhumation, but did, however, issue an order to add another layer of soil, about 80cm thick, to the existing layer of soil, since this was a gully [a streambed – author’s note], „*insisting to the VJ officers present, Captain Krsmanović and Major Čorbić, that investigations be undertaken by the military investigative authorities*“ [italics added by the HLC].⁹⁹

79. In the absence of further clarification of the refusal of the investigative judge to issue an order for exhumation, it is important to note that according to the Law on the Jurisdiction of Courts, the military investigation authorities conducted investigations of crimes committed by military personnel.¹⁰⁰

31

80. What the Clearing-up Squad of the 37th mtbr did with the bodies later on is unknown. The facts as to whether this squad, or the Command of the 37th mtbr, informed the military investigative authorities also remain unknown,¹⁰¹ and if so, whether they took over the investigation regarding the bodies found in the mass grave in Rezallë/Rezala.

81. During the trial in the *Šainović et al.* case, the ICTY Prosecution attempted to determine the further actions undertaken with regard to the bodies found in Rezallë/Rezala by examining witness 6D-2, but without results.¹⁰²

96 Order for the clearing-up of the battlefield of the 125th mtbr, April 4th 1999, ex.no. P01246, *Šainović et al.*

97 The MUP’s list of registered criminal offences and measures taken in Kosovo and Metohija in the period from July 1st 1998 to June 20th 1999, p. 17, ex.no. 6D00614, *Šainović et al.*, Appendix 4.

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid.

100 Article 1 of the Law on Military Courts (Official Gazette of the FRY no. 11, March 3rd 1995).

101 According to the Law on Military Courts, the military chief is obligated to notify the military investigative authorities about committed criminal offences. See Articles 60 and 61 of the Law on Military Courts (Official Gazette of the FRY no. 11, March 3rd 1995.); Statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević, at the time the deputy head of the Department for Security of the VJ, para. 50, ex.no. P02600, *Šainović et al.*

102 Testimony of witness 6D-2 in the *Šainović et al.* case from April 16th 2008, p. 25482.



82. On April 14th 1999, the Priština Corps Command issued a request to the MUP for the clearing-up of the area of the villages of „Gornje Obrinje, *Rezala* and Kraljica“ [italics added by the HLC]. Although this request only mentions the corpses of animals, it is worthy of attention because it confirms the formal supremacy of the VJ over the MUP in the procedure of clearing-up, and it coincides with the removal of bodies from Rezallë/Rezala, as well as with the inspection of the scene undertaken by the investigative judge.¹⁰³

83. The documents of the VJ indicate that the 37th mtbr was engaged in some sort of a procedure of checking and establishing the circumstances relating to the bodies in Rezallë/Rezala. Specifically, the report of the Commission for the collection of materials on executed clear-ups of the battlefields on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija during 1998/1999 states that the VJ found 30 bodies in Rezallë/Rezala, but that they were neither „forensically processed“ nor identified. The report notes that for these „human bodies, which had been found, it was determined with certainty that the deaths of these persons were not the result of the activity of the members of the VJ“, without clarifying how this was „determined with certainty“ or to whom the bodies were then handed over.¹⁰⁴ The report leads to the conclusion that this checking was most likely performed by the Security Department of the 37th mtbr without engaging the military investigative authorities, which is contrary to the rules of the VJ.¹⁰⁵

84. In contrast to the data which suggest that the 37th mtbr had formal responsibility for collecting bodies in that area, as well as a direct insight into the existence of mass graves in Rezallë/Rezala, the Commander of this brigade, Ljubiša Diković, in his testimony before the ICTY in the *Šainović et al.* case, claimed that he had never encountered any mass graves in that area:

Prosecutor Carter – question to witness Diković: So, even though your unit was directly involved in that area, no one from the VJ called upon you to answer for any of those operations or to provide any information when mass graves were found?

Witness Diković – answer: Well, I don't know which mass graves you actually mean. At the time that I was there I did not come across any mass graves, no mass graves at all. Let me repeat that. I did not come across any mass graves in that area.¹⁰⁶

85. Although the prosecutor asked this question primarily in relation to the operations around

103 Request for clearing-up of the terrain of the regions of Gornje Obrinje, Rezala and Kraljica villages from April 14th 1999, ex.no. 5D00193, *Šainović et al.*

104 The report of the Commission for the collection of material on executed clear-ups of the battlefield in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija during 1998/1999, of May 25th 2001 in „The Army of Yugoslavia and Kosovo and Metohija in 1998-1999“, Ivan Marković, p. 110, ex.no. P01011, *Šainović et al.*

105 See Articles 60 and 61 of the Law on Military Courts (Official Gazette of the FRY no. 11, March 3rd 1995); Statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević, at the time the deputy head of the Department for Security of the VJ, para. 50, ex.no. P02600, *Šainović et al.*

106 Testimony of Ljubiša Diković from December 11th 2007 in the *Šainović et al.* case, p. 19987.



the village of Izbicë/Izbica at the end of March 1999, it is inconceivable that Diković is denying any knowledge of any mass graves in that region, when it is known that the Clearing-up Squad of his brigade had information about the mass grave in Rezallë/Rezala, which is located 12km away from Izbicë/Izbica.

2. The killing of 27 Albanian civilians in Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo

86. Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo village is located in the Municipality of Gllogoc/Glogovac, some 5 km north-east from the town of Gllogoc/Glogovac. On the basis of the evidence obtained, the HLC established that on **April 17th, 1999**, members of the Serbian forces killed **27 Kosovo Albanian civilians** there. The citizens of the village who survived the crime buried the bodies in the places where they found them, but in early June the bodies were taken from the village in military trucks by members of the MUP. 20 bodies of victims of this crime have been exhumed from the Rudnica mass grave, while seven bodies that the survivors buried are located in Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo.

87. The official military documents and testimonies of military officers analyzed in this Dossier indicate that the village of Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo was in the area of responsibility of the 37th mtbr at the time of the commission of the crime, and that the action during which crimes against the citizens of Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo were committed was launched by joint forces of the units of the 37th mtbr, the 15th okbr and the members of the 86th detachment of the PJP, on April 17th, 1999. Military documents and testimonies of police officials indicate that during the time period in question the clearing-up of the battlefield in the Municipality of Gllogoc/Glogovac was under the jurisdiction of the 37th mtbr.

33

2.2. Description of events based on witness statements

88. In the early morning hours of April 17th 1999, the Serbian forces surrounded the village of Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo. After random shelling of the villagers' houses, soldiers and police officers entered the village at around 6 a.m. In groups of three to five, they entered houses, beat, humiliated and intimidated citizens, confiscated their money, jewelry and any even remotely valuable personal belongings. Several persons were seriously injured and several were killed in their houses, in front of their family members and neighbors. The survivors were expelled from their houses and gathered in several places in the village, all the while being beaten and threatened with weapons. Most of them, mainly from the Morina family, gathered in their *Morina mahala* [Morina neighborhood].

89. After repeated searching and beating, the police officers and soldiers separated the men from the women and children. The houses and all other facilities in the village were immediately burned down. Women and children, threatened with weapons, were ordered to form a column and leave the village, in the direction of Gllogoc/Glogovac. Some of the men were immediately killed, mostly by shots from automatic weapon at close range. Others were split into three groups and led to the backyards of



their cousins Yllber Morina, Ali Morina and Sejdi Morina, and shot by rifle from close range. In these events, a total of 27 Kosovo Albanian civilians were killed.¹⁰⁷

90. In the evening, a few villagers who survived the crime buried the bodies in the places where they found them, in four graves. These survivors had been hiding in the forest near the village until the Serbian forces retreated from Kosovo. According to their testimony, in early June the police came to the village and started digging up the graves. The bodies were loaded into a military truck, and the corpses of cows were laid in the dug up graves.¹⁰⁸

91. When the citizens returned to the village after the retreat of Serbian forces from Kosovo, only seven bodies of the victims killed on April 17th 1999 were found in the places where the survivors had buried them: **Merrushe** (Hys) **Shala** (1970), **Florin** (Tahir) **Morina** (1962), **Azem** (Bajram) **Morina** (1930), **Zenel** (Sylë) **Morina** (1930), **Bajram** (Vesel) **Makolli** (1925), **Kadri** (Tahir) **Karagja** (1922) and **Tahir** (Hetem) **Morina** (1937).¹⁰⁹

92. The mortal remains of 20 civilians killed in Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo were found in the Rudnica mass grave: **Haxhë** (Hazir) **Demaku** (1980), **Sheremet** (Rexhep) **Morina** (1971), **Selim** (Sadri) **Morina** (1967), **Afrim** (Bahtir) **Morina** (1965), **Emin** (Sadri) **Morina** (1958), **Brahim** (Sheremet) **Morina** (1957), **Sabit** (Ali) **Morina** (1956), **Tahir** (Zeqir) **Morina** (1951), **Gani** (Haxhi) **Morina** (1949), **Isuf** (Fetah) **Morina** (1948), **Beqir** (Zeqir) **Morina** (1945), **Beqir** (Jashar) **Morina** (1943), **Bahtir** (Hetem) **Morina** (1942), **Avdyl** (Hazir) **Morina** (1938), **Rexhep** (Sheremet) **Morina** (1938), **Kadri** (Haradin) **Morina** (1937), **Sylë** (Haxhi) **Morina** (1935), **Daut** (Jashar) **Morina** (1931), **Arif** (Zeqir) **Morina** (1920) and **Muharrem** (Rrustem) **Morina** (1912).¹¹⁰


107 The HLC database, statement of witness F. M. given to the HLC in May 2000; statement of witness M.M. given to the HLC in May 2000; statement of witness K.K. given to the HLC in May 2000; statement of witness Aj. M. given to the HLC in April 2008; statement of witness Ar. M. given to the HLC in April 2008; statement of witness Ars. M. given to the HLC in April 2008; statement of witness B. M. given to the HLC in April 2008; statement of witness H. M. given to the HLC in April 2008; statement of witness H. M. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness I. M. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness M. M. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness X. M. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness Z. M. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness Ze. M. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness F. D. given to the HLC in October 2007; statement of witness Ma. M. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness E. M. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness Ha. M. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness Hav. M. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness I. K. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness M. M. given to the HLC in June 2008; statement of witness V. M. given to the HLC in May 2008.

108 The HLC database, statement of witness F. M. given to the HLC in May 2000; statement of witness F. D. given to the HLC in October 2007.

109 The HLC database, statement of witness V. M. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness E. M. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness H. M. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness H. V. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness I. K. given to the HLC in May 2008; statement of witness M.M. given to the HLC in June 2008.

110 Data of the Office for Missing Persons of the Government of Republic of Kosovo, emails sent on: August 26th 2014, September 14th 2014 and October 15th 2014.





Map 3

2.3. Military documents and testimonies of VJ officers

93. The two-day operation of the clearing-up of the battlefield which encompasses the village of Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo, which was launched on April 16th, 1999 on the orders of the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija, was carried out by units of the 37th mtbr and 15th okbr, and the 86th detachment of the PJP.

94. The evidence gathered from the military and police sources also point to the responsibility of the 37th mtbr for the removal of the bodies on the territory of Gllogoc/Glogovac.

2.3.1. Operations for establishing combat control of the territory and the 'clearing-up of the battlefield'

95. The Command of the 37th mtbr issued a **Defence Order, Operation number 125-2**", signed by the Commander of the 37th mtbr, Ljubiša Diković. According to the order, the task of the 37th mtbr was to "set up defence in the Kukavica (tt. 591 exclusive) - Gradina (tt.1055 inclusive) – Goleš pass (exclusive) - Suvo Brdo (tt.734 inclusive) area" for the purpose of defence against possible attacks launched by NATO forces and the KLA, **starting from April 16th, 1999**".¹¹¹ The village of Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo is located almost in the center of this area (see Map 3).

96. This Order tasks certain units with establishing control over certain territories in this brigade's area of responsibility. Hence, the **Third Motorized Battalion of the 37th mtbr**, along with three other units of the 37th mtbr (armored battalion, engineers battalion, and a mixed antitank-artillery division) and the **15th okbr's Second Battalion** was ordered to take combat control over an area which includes the village of Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo. Namely, "the line from Globare to the village of Bardići", was set as the right border of the area that would be placed under the control of this unit. A look at the map shows that the line goes through Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo (see Map 4).

97. On April 15th, 1999, the 37th mtbr and 15th okbr received an order coming from the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija to engage **as of April 16th, 1999**, in a two-day joint operation with MUP units "to break and destroy SHTF" at Mount Čičavica and in the sector of the villages of Vasilevë/Vasiljevo and Dobroshec/Dobroševac.¹¹²


98. **Regular combat report of the 37th mtbr** dated April 16th, 1999 shows that the 37th mtbr had been regulating the movements in the entire area of responsibility of the Brigade as of that day.¹¹³

111 Order For Defence, Command of the 37th mtbr dated April 13th, 1999, p.2, ex. no. 5D01029, Item 2, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 5.

112 Order to defeat and destroy SHTF in the sector of Čičavica, Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija, ex.no. P01974, *Šainović et al*.

113 Regular combat report of the 37th mtbr dated April 16th, 1999, ex. no. 5D01055, Item 5.1, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 6.





Map 4

99. It is also stated that the Commander of the 37th mtbr, Ljubiša Diković, attended a meeting held that day, which referred to the operation ordered by the Joint Command to the 37th mtbr and 15th okbr, and that together with the Chief of Staff of the 37th mtbr he carried out a reconnaissance of the terrain.¹¹⁴ The reconnaissance of the terrain was also attended by the Commanders of the First and Second Armored Battalion of the 15th okbr.¹¹⁵

100. The same report offers an overview of the daily activities undertaken by the 37th mtbr related to the execution of orders issued by the Joint Command to “crush and destroy SHTF”, and it reports that the operation will be continued the following day, that is, April 17th, 1999.

101. The ICTY court records do not contain the combat report of the 37th mtbr dated April 17th, 1999. In December 2014, the HLC requested this document from the Ministry of Defence, but has not received it by the time of the publishing of this Dossier.

102. The entry made by the Commander of the 15th okbr, Mladen Ćirković, in the war diary of this brigade for April 16th and 17th, 1999, confirms the participation of units of the 15th okbr in the ‘clearing-up of the territory’ operations at Čičavica.¹¹⁶

103. According to the MUP’s document dated April 17th, 1999, the 3rd Company of the 86th Detachment of the PJP was engaged in Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo on April 17th, 1999.¹¹⁷

104. The 4th Company of the 86th Detachment of the PJP was deployed that same day in the neighboring village of Poklek. The 1st and the 2nd Companies were deployed in the direction of Llapushnik/Lapušnik – Arllat/Orlate – Durdica/Đurdica and Glogoc/Glogovac – Poluzhë/Poluža, at an approximate distance of 2 to 10 km from Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo, while the 5th Company was positioned in the Feronikl factory in Glogoc/Glogovac.¹¹⁸

2.3.2. Bodies under the jurisdiction of the Clearing-up Squad of the 37th mtbr

105. Unlike in the case of the village of Rezallë/Rezala (para. 72-85), there are no public military or police documents pointing to the discovery of or actions involving the bodies of the persons who were killed in Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo (on April 17th) by members of the VJ or the MUP or the civilian government authorities. Still, military documents and the testimony of a police official do point to the fact that the clearing-up of the battlefield during the time in question in the Municipality

114 Ibid.

115 War diary of the 15th Armored Brigade, entry for April 16th, 1999, ex. no. P02572, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 7.

116 War diary of the 15th Armored Brigade, entry for April 17th, 1999, ex.no. P02572, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 7.

117 Deployment of the PJP on April 17th 1999, ex. no. 5D01417, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 8. It is unknown which institution is the author of this document, however, its content was confirmed in the *Šainović et al*. trial by Dusko Adamovic, assistant Chief of the MUP Staff for the rotation of MUP units in Kosovo.

118 Ibid. Members of the VJ and MUP killed over 50 civilians - members of the Muccolli family in a house in Poklek, according to the testimonies of witnesses, and then they burnt their bodies. There were 23 children among the killed.



of Glllogoc/Glogovac was under the jurisdiction of the 37th mtbr.

106. According to the order issued by the PrC, each of the VJ brigades was responsible for the clearing-up in its area of responsibility.¹¹⁹

107. As mentioned earlier (para. 73), the Clearing-up Squad of the 37th mtbr was established on April 5th, 1999 (12 days prior to the crime committed in Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo), with the task to collect information on the killed and to report thereon to the responsible investigation authorities.¹²⁰

108. In early June, when the bodies were, according to the statements given by the witnesses, exhumed and taken away from the village, Çikatovë e Vjetër/Staro Čikatovo was in the area of responsibility of the 37th mtbr.¹²¹

109. The former Chief of the Department of the Interior in Glllogoc/Glogovac, Petar Damjanac, testified before the ICTY that the VJ was the one responsible in this municipality for the clearing-up, and that he maintained contact for this purpose with the Commander of the Clear-up Squad of the 37th mtbr, Rade Krsmanović, and his Deputy Hasan Čorbić.¹²² He also pointed out in his testimony that the MUP Department in Glllogoc/Glogovac did not carry out the clearing-up because the municipal government in Glllogoc/Glogovac was not operational during the NATO intervention in 1999 in Kosovo, and that they did not have a crisis committee, civil protection or a single truck.¹²³

110. The allegation that the civilian government in Glllogoc/Glogovac was not operational at the time period in question was also confirmed by the report of the 37th mtbr Command on the situation in Glllogoc/Glogovac dated May 3rd, 1999.¹²⁴

39

3. Abuse and enforced disappearance of civilians in Zabel i Ulet/Donji Zabelj

111. Zabel i Ulët/Donji Zabelj is located in the Municipality of Glllogoc/Glogovac some 5 km south of the town of Glllogoc/Glogovac. On the basis of the gathered evidence, the HLC established that on May 12th, 1999, after abusing and forcing **four civilians**, Kosovo Albanians from the village, to work, Serbian forces put them inside a truck and transported them in an unknown direction. After this event, every trace of them was lost, until their bodies were found in the mass grave in Rudnica. The available documents of the VJ show that control over Zabel i Ulët/Donji Zabelj and its surroundings

119 Order for hygiene and sanitation measures in the battlefields signed by Lazarević, March 31st, 1999, ex. no. 5D00352. Šainović *et al*, Appendix 1.

120 Order of the 37th mtbr for the clearing-up of the battlefield dated April 5th, 1999, ex.no 5D01028, Šainović *et al*, Appendix 2.

121 For instance, see Combat Report of the 37th mtbr dated June 7th, 1999, ex.no. 5D01062, Šainović *et al*.

122 Testimony of Petar Damjanac in the Šainović *et al*. case dated March 6th, 2008, p. 23764.

123 Ibid, p. 23764-23765.

124 Report on the situation in Glllogoc/Glogovac by the Command of the 37th mtbr, May 3rd, 1999, ex.no 5D01037, Šainović *et al*.



was under the jurisdiction of the 37th mtbr, while the 15th okbr carried out operations near this village.

3.1. Description of events based on witness statements

112. Around 10 a.m. on May 12th, 1999, six or seven individuals wearing uniforms entered the village of Zabel i Ulët/Donji Zabelj. Witnesses identified these persons as “paramilitaries”. They were looking for volunteers in the village for work. Since no one volunteered, they took 14 men out of their houses and beat them. Then they took them to Nazif Curri’s backyard, where they continued hitting them with wooden sticks and rifle butts, and humiliated them and made them dig ditches.¹²⁵

113. A “Dajc” military truck¹²⁶ with a green covering stopped on the street at around 4 p.m. Several soldiers came out of the truck and, after arguing with the “paramilitaries”, forcibly took four villagers from the group who were digging out the ditches - **Afrim** (Selim) **Ahmeti** (1961), **Valbon** (Qazim) **Ahmeti** (1967), **Nuhi** (Sabit) **Buçinca** (1964) and **Shaban** (Halit) **Buçinca** (1955) – and put them inside the truck and transported them in the direction of Glogoc/Glogovac. This was the last time they were seen alive.¹²⁷

114. The paramilitaries then ordered the remaining 10 men to continue digging. At around 8 p.m. the commander of the paramilitaries known by the nickname of “Babo” told the detained men that the four civilians who had been taken away had tried to escape and that the “military police took them in order to identify them”.¹²⁸

115. They released the remaining ten villagers before dusk. The villagers waited until 11 p.m. that evening for Afrim (Selim) Ahmeti, Valbon (Qazim) Ahmeti, Nuhi (Sabit) Bučinca and Shaban (Halit) Bučinca to return. Since they did not show up, the villagers of Zabel i Ulët/Donji Zabelj ran away from the village. When they returned on June 12th, 1999, they found their houses burnt down.¹²⁹

3.2. Military documents

116. The village of Zabel i Ulët/Donji Zabelj was in the area of responsibility of the 37th mtbr from the beginning of the NATO intervention until the retreat in mid-June 1999. A number of combat reports, orders and other documents from the communication of this brigade and the Priština Corps during

125 HLC database, statement by B.B. given to the HLC, October 2014.

126 Magirus-Deutz truck made in the Maribor Car Factory (TAM).

127 HLC database, statement given by B.B. to HLC, October 2014, statement given by witness H.F. to HLC, January 2008.

128 HLC database, statement given by B.B. to HLC, October 2014.

129 HLC database, statement given by witness V. A. to HLC, July 2011.



the time in question provide evidence thereof.¹³⁰

117. Besides executing combat tasks, the 37th mtbr also had broad jurisdiction over the civilian population in this area – their registration, control, accommodation, provision of safety, distribution of food, and so forth,¹³¹ due to the fact (paras. 109-110) that the civilian authorities in the Municipality of Glogoc/Glogovac were not operational.¹³²

118. The 37th mtbr controlled the movement in the area of responsibility as of mid-April 1999.¹³³

119. On May 12th, a part of the 15th okbr participated, together with the 37th mtbr, in the operation known as “Gospoda” (“Mrs.”- translator’s note) in the sector of Lipovica (the Municipality of Lipjan/Lipljan) at about 3.5 km from the Zabel i Ulët/Donji Zabelj.¹³⁴

4. Killing of Rrahman Nika in Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo

120. Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo is located in the Municipality of Glogoc/Glogovac at about 7 km north-east of the town of Glogoc/Glogovac. Based on the evidence gathered, the HLC established that on May 27th, 1999, the Serbian forces killed a civilian from the village and wounded another civilian. The body of Rrahman Nika, the victim, was taken after the killing by members of the VJ, and was discovered only in 2014 in the mass grave in Rudnica. The presence of the 37th mtbr on the day in question in the village has been without a doubt established on the basis of the military documents acquired by the HLC. The responsibility of the 37th mtbr included responsibility for the clear-up, that is, for the removal of victims’ bodies from the territory of Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo.

41

130 For instance, see the Regular combat report of the 37th mtbr dated May 7th, 1999, ex.no. 5D01060, *Šainović et al*; Combat Order of the 37th mtbr dated May 5th, 1999, ex.no. 5D01038, *Šainović et al*; Regular combat report of the 37th mtbr dated May 1st, 1999, ex.no. 5D01058, *Šainović et al*; Regular combat report of the 37th mtbr dated May 13th, 1999, ex.no. 5D01085, *Šainović et al*; and Regular combat report of the 37th mtbr dated May 17th, 1999, ex.no. 5D01084, *Šainović et al*.

131 For instance, see the telegram sent by the Commander of the PrC, Vladimir Lazarević, to the commanders of subordinate units, dated May 2nd, 1999, strictly confidential no. 455-205, ex. no. 5D0389, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 9; telegram by Commander of the 37th mtbr Ljubiša Diković to the Commander of the PrC Vladimir Lazarević dated May 4th, 1999, strictly confidential no. 326-2, ex. no. 5D01080, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 10; and Report of the Command of the 37th mtbr on the situation in Glogoc/Glogovac from May 13th, 1999, confidential, no. – 446-2, ex.no. 5D01086, *Šainović et al*.

132 Testimony of Petar Damjanac in the *Šainović et al* case dated March 6th, 2008, p. 23764-23765; Report of the Command of the 37th mtbr on the situation in Glogoc/Glogovac dated May 3rd, 1999, ex. no.5D01037, *Šainović et al*; Report of the Command of the Priština Corps on the situation in Glogoc/Glogovac dated May 13th, 1999, ex. no. 5D00412, *Šainović et al*.

133 Regular combat report of the 37th mtbr dated April 16th, 1999, ex.no. 5D01055, Item 5.1, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 6.

134 War diary of the 15th Armored Brigade of the VJ, entry for May 12th, 1999, ex.no. P02572, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 11.



4.1. Description of events based on witness statements

121. Owing to the frequent attacks by the Serbian forces, Rahman Nika was hiding in the “*Ljugu i Madhe*” forest in the village of Dobroshec/Dobroševac (the Municipality of Glllogoc/Glogovac) together with his family, as of the beginning of the war. In the evening of May 26th, 1999, Rahman, together with his cousins, went to the village of Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo to get some food. They headed back from the village of Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo on May 27th around 1 a.m. When they reached the settlement of Berisha in Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo, the Serbian forces abruptly started shooting in their direction. Rahman was shot and fell to the ground, and remained lying on the road, while the cousins managed to escape. Some members of the KLA told Rahman’s wife that they saw a number of Serbian soldiers taking his body that same day, dragging it along the ground in an unknown direction.¹³⁵

4.2. Military documents and testimonies of MUP officials

122. A large number of members of the **3rd Motorized Battalion of the 37th mtbr** were in Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo on May 26th, 1999.

123. The document of the Command of the VJ Third Army dated May 28th, 1999, entitled “Observations made during the inspection of the 37th mtbr”, stated that the 3rd Motorized Battalion of the 37th mtbr was positioned in the area encompassing Gllanasellë/Gladno Selo, with some 800 of its members. “The following situation was observed during the inspection of the 3rd Motorized Battalion of the 37th Motorized Brigade: the Battalion took control of the following defence sector: *Gladno selo* [Gllanasellë] – t.t./trig point/ 756 (Lipoglav) – Gornji Grabovac (the width of the defence sector is approximately 12 km)” [italics added by HLC].¹³⁶ This document further states that the battalion had 806 soldiers, and that “approximately 85% troops are present.”¹³⁷

124. Apart from the fact that on the day when Rahman Nika was killed, the forces of the 37th mtbr were deployed in the village and accordingly there is a reasonable presumption that it was the members of this unit who removed Rahman Nika’s body (or at least had knowledge about who had done this), there is another important piece of evidence pointing to the fact that the 37th mtbr was responsible for the removal of bodies on the territory of Glllogoc/Glogovac. Namely, we would hereby like to remind the reader of the fact (see para. 109) that the former Head of the Department of the Interior in Glllogoc/Glogovac testified that the VJ was responsible for the clearing-up in this municipality, and that for this purpose he had contact with the clear-up squad of the 37th mtbr.¹³⁸ He also stressed that the Glllogoc/Glogovac MUP Department did not carry out the clearing-up because the municipal government in Glllogoc/Glogovac was not operational during the NATO intervention in Kosovo in

135 HLC database, statement of witness V. N. given to HLC, June 2008.

136 Observations made during the inspection of the 37th mtbr by the 3rd Army of the VJ dated May 28th, 1999, p. 3, ex. no. 5D01441, *Šainović et al*, Appendix 12.

137 Ibid.

138 Testimony of Petar Damjanac in the *Šainović et al*. case dated March 6th, 2008, p. 23764.



1999.¹³⁹ A number of documents produced by the 37th mtbr and PrC also confirm the situation in Glogoc/Glogovac.¹⁴⁰

VIII. VJ and MUP units which participated in operations in which crimes were committed

125. Based on the accessible evidence, the HLC has established with certainty the participation of three units in the VJ and MUP operations, during which the civilians whose bodies were found in Rudnica had been killed. The basic information on these units is given in the text below.

1. 37th Motorized Brigade of the VJ

126. The home barracks of the 37th mtbr was located in Raška, hence it was also known by the name of the “Raška Brigade”.¹⁴¹ It was part of the Užice Corps of the Second Army of the VJ and it was resubordinated to the Priština Corps of the Third Army on March 7th, 1999, by the order of the VJ General Staff.¹⁴²

127. Until the beginning of the NATO intervention on March 24th, 1999, the 37th mtbr had carried out “intensive combat training focused on increasing the combat readiness level” in Kosovo.¹⁴³ The 37th mtbr had already conducted anti-terrorist operations before the war.¹⁴⁴

128. The entire 37th mtbr, that is some 4,500 of its members, arrived in Drenica in early April 1999,¹⁴⁵ and stayed there until it retreated from Kosovo completely on June 16th, 1999, to its barracks in Raška.¹⁴⁶

129. After the war in Kosovo, 10 members of the 37th mtbr received the Medal of Honor for demonstrated courage, 175 were awarded the Defence and Security Medal of Merit, and 132 members were promoted in an extraordinary promotion.¹⁴⁷

130. The medals and the “fame” that the 37th mtbr achieved after the war in Kosovo is linked to the

139 Ibid, p.23764-23765.

140 Report by the 37th mtbr on the situation in Glogoc/Glogovac dated May 3rd, 1999, ex. no. 5D01037, *Šainović et al*; Report by the Command of the Priština Corps on the situation in Glogoc/Glogovac dated May 13th, 1999, ex. no. 5D00412, *Šainović et al*.

141 Testimony of Ljubiša Diković from December 10th, 2007 in the *Šainović et al*. case, p. 19870.

142 VJ General Staff Order for resubordination of the 37th mtbr, March 6th 1999, ex.no. 3D00680, *Šainović et al*.

143 Testimony of Ljubiša Diković from December 10th, 2007 in the *Šainović et al*. case, p. 19871.

144 Ibid, p.19939-19940.

145 Ibid, p. 19872; Combat report of the 37th mtbr dated April 3rd, 1999, ex.no. P02807, *Šainović et al*.

146 Article, „Vojska“, „Brave men of Drenica, heroes of defence“, p.11-13, July 15th, 1999.

147 Ibid.



allegations that Drenica was the “stronghold of the KLA” and the “terrorist nest”.¹⁴⁸ However, the fact is that during the deployment of the 37th mtbr in Drenica, some 180 “terrorists”, that is members of the KLA, were killed in this area, whereas 1,400 civilians were killed.¹⁴⁹

131. Ljubiša Diković, the then Colonel, was the Commander of the 37th mtbr during 1999.¹⁵⁰

132. The President of the Republic of Serbia appointed him Chief of the General Staff of Serbia in December 12th, 2011 and he has been holding this position ever since. At present, Ljubiša Diković holds the rank of General.¹⁵¹

133. In 2012, the HLC published the Ljubiša Diković Dossier, in which it described seven crimes in which members of the brigade mentioned herein had participated and which resulted in the deaths of more than 450 civilians.¹⁵²

i. Battalion Commanders of the 37th mtbr

134. Captain 1st Class Dragan Mitrović held the position of the Commander of the 1st Battalion of the 37th mtbr, and after his death he was replaced by his Deputy, Captain Aleksandar Marković. Captain Dejan Randelović was the Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 37th mtbr, while 1st Lieutenant Zoran Gavrilović was the Commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 37th mtbr, and after his death he was replaced by Major Draženko Mirić. The Commander of the Armored Battalion of the 37th mtbr was Captain 1st Class Goran Jovanović. Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Puđa held the position of the Commander of the Howitzer Battalion of the 37th mtbr.¹⁵³ Lieutenant Colonel Stošić was the Commander of the Logistics Battalion of the 37th mtbr,¹⁵⁴ while the Commander of the Artillery Battalion of the 37th mtbr was Major Milanović.¹⁵⁵

2. 15th Armored Brigade of the VJ

135. The 15th okbr was a unit subordinated to the VJ Priština Corps.¹⁵⁶

136. This Brigade’s area of responsibility encompassed the north of Kosovo, particularly the Municipalities of Prishtinë/Priština, Vushtrri/Vučitrn and Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, as well as

148 Testimony of Ljubiša Diković from December 10th, 2007 in the *Šainović et al.* case p.19874.

149 HLC database, accessed on October 9th, 2014.

150 Testimony of Ljubiša Diković from December 10th, 2007 in the *Šainović et al.* case p. 19870.

151 Ibid, p.19869; Biography of the Chief of General Staff, official web page of the Serbian Army <http://www.vs.rs/index.php?content=8709fe1d-fdf2-102b-9fa8-28e40361dc2e> accessed on October 18th, 2014.

152 Ljubiša Diković Dossier with Annex dated January 23rd, 2012, available at <http://www.hlc-rdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Ljubisa-Dikovic-Dosije-and-Prilog.pdf>.

153 Article, Vojska, „Example to Generations”, pp.9-13, July 15th, 1999.

154 Testimony of Ljubiša Diković from December 10th, 2007 in the *Šainović et al.* case, p.19918.

155 Ibid, p. 19921.

156 ICTY Trial Judgment in the *Šainović et al.* case rendered on February 26th 2009, Vol. I, p.245-6.



parts of the Municipalities of Lipjan/Lipljan and Gillogoc/Glogovac.¹⁵⁷

137. The Command of the 15th okbr was located in the period March 26th-May 12th, 1999, in the premises of the “Vuk Karadžić” Elementary School in Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje.¹⁵⁸

138. During the armed conflict in Kosovo, the Commander of the 15th okbr was Colonel Mladen Ćirković.¹⁵⁹ The then President of Serbia, Boris Tadić, appointed Ćirković Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Serbian Army on February 15th, 2009, which position he held until he retired in 2011. He held the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel General at the moment of his retirement.¹⁶⁰

139. The Chief of Staff of the 15th okbr was Mladen Nišević.¹⁶¹ By the act of the then President Boris Tadić, Nišević was appointed Chief of Staff of the Training Command in 2009, and in 2010 he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General.¹⁶² The President of the Republic of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić, issued an act in January 2013 by which he appointed Mladen Nišević Deputy Commander of the Serbian Army Training Command.¹⁶³

140. The Commander of the 2nd Armored Battalion was Major Predrag Jovanović, while his Deputy was Captain 1st Class Zdravko Dabižljević, who presently holds the position of the Chief of Department for the Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Second Brigade of the Serbian Army.¹⁶⁴

157 Testimony of Vladimir Marinković on December 13th, 2007 in the *Šainović et al.* case, p. 20252; Testimony of Vladimir Marinković on December 14th, 2007 in the *Šainović et al.* case, p. 20302.

158 War diary of the 15th Armoured Brigade of the Yugoslav Army, ex.no.P02572, *Šainović et al.*

159 Ibid.

160 Politika, “Miloje Miletic Chief of General Staff”, February 15th, 2009, available in Serbian at <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/vesti-dana/Miloje-Miletic-nachelnik-Generalshtaba.lt.html> accessed on January 6th, 2015.

161 Lakić Đorović, “For general’s ranks they declared a killed soldier a deserter”, April 12th 2013 available in Serbian at <http://zokstersomething.com/2013/04/12/lakic-dorovic-za-generalske-cinove-ubijenog-vojnika-proglasili-dezertrom/>, accessed on January 15th 2015.

162 Blic, “Tadić Has Appointed A Number of Officers to New Duties”, February 15th, 2010, available in Serbian at <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/176782/Tadic-postavio-niz-oficira-na-nove-duznosti> pristupljeno dana 6 accessed on January 6th, 2015.

163 Akter, “Nikolić Has Rendered Acts On Appointments to New Positions”, January 4th, 2013, available in Serbian at <http://www.akter.co.rs/29-bezbednost/26499-nikoli-doneo-ukaze-o-imenovanju-na-nove-funkcije.html> pristupljeno dana 6. accessed on January 6th, 2015.

164 Lakić Đorović, “For general’s ranks they declared a killed soldier a deserter”, April 12th 2013 available in Serbian at <http://zokstersomething.com/2013/04/12/lakic-dorovic-za-generalske-cinove-ubijenog-vojnika-proglasili-dezertrom/>, accessed on January 15th 2015; “Doctors of the Second Brigade in the villages of Tutin Municipality”, available in Serbian at: http://www.vs.rs/index.php?news_article=f628c308-d06e-11e3-9f60-00163e135009, accessed January 18 2015.



3. 86th Detachment of the PJP

141. The 86th Detachment of the PJP was part of the B formations of the PJP, that is a part of the PJP territorial detachments.¹⁶⁵

142. Members of the 86th PJP Detachment were sent from the Secretariats of the Interior located on the territory of the Central Serbia to the territory of Kosovo. Hence, members of the Požarevac Secretariat were sent to the Glogoc/Glogovac Secretariat, of the Smederevo one to the Podujevë/Podujevo Secretariat, while members of the Kragujevac Secretariat of Interior were sent to the Vushtrri/Vučitrn Secretariat.¹⁶⁶

143. The 86th PJP Detachment was resubordinated in late April 1999 to the Command of the 37th mtbr.¹⁶⁷

144. The Commander of the 86th PJP Detachment was a certain Dragan Obradović.¹⁶⁸

165 The territorial detachments included, apart from the 86th Detachment, the 73rd, 85th, and 87th Detachments - Testimony of Vladimir Ilić in the *Šainović et al.* case from March 17th, 2008, T. 24349; Statement of witness Dragan Zivaljevic given on March 31st, 2008, para. 6, ex.no. 6D01606, *Šainović et al.*

166 Serbian Ministry of the Interior, Telegram no. 297 dated February 16th, 1999, ex.no. P00139, *Dorđević*.

167 Plan for engagement of joint squads dated April 25th, 1999, ex.no. 6D01023, *Šainović et al.*

168 Minutes from the meeting held in the MUP Staff for Kosovo and Metohija in Prishtinë/Priština on May 11th, 1999, ex.no P01993, *Šainović et al.*



GARRISON COMMAND
Strictly confidential no. 28-141
31 March 1999

Telegram

U R G E N T

Order for hygiene and sanitation measures in battlefields

Pursuant to the Instructions for hygiene and sanitation measures in battlefields and international conventions, and in order to prevent the pollution of water, food, land and air, I hereby issue the following

O R D E R:

1. Hygiene and sanitation measures in the battlefields (gathering, finding dead bodies and animal carcasses and burying and removing them from the battlefield, as well as removing everything that could be dangerous to the health of people and animals) shall be organised and carried out immediately upon the halt of combat operations, as well as during combat and bombing, in the terrain where the dangers to the troops taking part in the clearing up have been eliminated (mine clearance, decontamination and so on).

2. Hygiene and sanitation measures in battlefields in their zone of responsibility shall be organised and carried out by units VJ /Yugoslav Army/ in a coordinated action with units of the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ and local organs of authority (judicial organs, organs of authority in the municipality and so on).

3. Rescue teams primarily provide assistance to the wounded, injured and sick and then conduct decontamination, clear up debris, put out fires, bury the dead, remove and bury animal carcasses, waste and so on. In clearing up the battlefields after a nuclear attack, fully abide by the ABH /nuclear-biological-chemical/ protection measures.

4. Form a hygiene and sanitation team per needs and at the decision of the commander of the company/brigade and units of corresponding rank.

A unit for hygiene and sanitation is generally a squad-detachment comprising the following: an investigating judge, a squad commander (detachment commander), a deputy commander of the team, an artillery detachment, a medical orderly, one veterinary medical orderly, four medical orderlies, two veterinary orderlies, one non-commissioned officer or sergeant each from the units which sustained the most casualties and two 2.5 ton field vehicles. The squad (team) shall be reinforced with members from the engineering company, the ABHO /atomic-biological-chemical defence/ and others.

5. At the municipality, depending on the size and intensity of combat activity, form and equip a work team for retrieval and burial of human and animal remains.
/handwritten: six soldiers /?from/ 1st mb /motorized battalion/

6. The InSI /Quartermaster Service/ Chief shall issue necessary work clothes to the hygiene and sanitation team, as regulated in sets; organise procurement of plastic body bags and making of coffins and grave markers in local carpenter workshops; receive quartermaster materiel gathered by the hygiene and sanitation team; organise the utilisation of meat of slaughtered cattle and reception of cattle for slaughter from

collection centres; organise the reception, conservation and evacuation of hides of slaughtered, killed and dead animals.

7. The Chief of the SnSI /Medical Service/ shall provide and issue all necessary medical instructions for clearing up after battle, organise a reception point for the wounded (collection point); procure disinfectants necessary to clear up the battlefield; inspect the ground and determine the place for the burial of our side's and the enemy's military personnel who have been killed (or have died).

8. The Chief of the Veterinary Service will provide and issue necessary veterinary instructions for clearing up the battlefield; organise a veterinary reception point and a collection point for animals.

9. The Chief of the Technical Service shall regulate reception of technical materiel collected by the sanitary and hygiene team.

10. The Chief of the SbSI /Traffic and Transport Service/ shall organise the transport of collected army property and personal belongings from where they were collected to the warehouses.

11. The investigating judge shall be in charge of clearing up the battlefield and the commander of the hygiene and sanitation team shall be in command, in the presence of representatives from the municipality and organs of the registrar's service.

Following the burial of bodies, the commander of the hygiene and sanitation squad shall give a copy of the list of the buried and a copy of a sketch of the cemetery to each representative.

The bodies of civilians who have been killed (or have died) will be turned over to the authorities for burial. The belongings of unidentified bodies shall be handed over to the recruiting office or to the garrison command under receipt.

12. Medical assistance should be provided to found wounded persons and they should be evacuated to the reception point for the wounded (collection point).

13. Wounded and sick hoofed animals should be gathered, provided veterinary assistance and then sent to the veterinary collection point. Healthy and fit hoofed animals and those intended for slaughter should be sent to the collection point. Stray dogs and cats should be killed on sight.

14. The bodies of those who have been killed (or have died) shall be transferred to the burial site. The bodies of those who have been killed (or have died) should be buried in separate or collective graves, and prior to their burial, the bodies should be placed in plastic body bags or coffins.

Dead (killed) animals should be skinned before they are buried.

Collected army property and personal belongings should be listed, placed in separate packages and sent to warehouses.

Following the completion of the clearing up, all records, lists of buried and the cemetery sketch, together with the personal belongings of those who have been killed (or have died) should be turned over to the garrison command or recruiting office.

15. Clearing up after battle in the border area shall be organised and carried out by units of the Army and outside this area by units of the MUP. For further information about clearing up operations consult the Instructions for hygiene and sanitation measures in battlefields or the Corps Commander.

16. The commander of the hygiene and sanitation team shall report to me verbally the completion of the clearing up after battle within two hours after the completion of the task.

ZV/SS
C O M M A N D E R
General Major
Vladimir LAZAREVIĆ
/signed and stamped/

Deliver by courier to: 15th okbr /armoured brigade/; 52nd bABHO / atomic-biological-chemical defence; nuclear-biological-chemical defence brigade/; 52nd bVP /Military Police Brigade/; PrK /Priština Corps/ Command; 3rd A /Army/ IKM /Forward Command Post/; 202nd POB /logistics base/ and the Priština MUP;

by telegram: 354th pbr /infantry brigade/; 211th okbr; 125th mtbr /motorised brigade/; 37th pbr; 125th mtbr okb /armoured battalion/; 549th mtbr; 243rd mtbr; 52nd mabr /mixed artillery brigade/; 175th pbr; 252nd TG /Tactical Group/-252 and 52nd PVO /anti-aircraft defence/ arbr /artillery rocket brigade/.

/handwritten: 25/ /handwritten: strictly 123-1/99 /

Command of the 37th mtr /Motorised Brigade/
 Strictly confidential no. /handwritten: 123-1/
 5 April 1999

MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
 Copy no. /handwritten: 1/

Order for clearing up
 the battlefield

To Command /handwritten: files/

Based on the Instructions for Clearing up Battlefields and the Orders of the Command of the Priština Corps strictly confidential no. 28-141 dated 31 March 1999, and with the aim of preventing pollution of water, food, soil and air, I hereby

ORDER:

1.- The clearing up of the battlefield (finding and removing human bodies and animal carcasses, their burial, as well as the removal of anything which could be harmful to the health of humans or animals) is to be organised and realised immediately during as well as after combat and bombardment in the terrain where dangers to the personnel participating in clearing up operations have been removed (demining, decontamination and the like).

2.- In order to perform the task of clearing up the battlefield, a squad in the following composition is to be formed immediately:

- Squad commander, Captain 1st Class Rade KRSMANOVIĆ,
- Deputy squad commander, Major Hasan ČORBIĆ,
- Group for security during clearing up operations, made up of six soldiers and a commander from headquarters administration,
- Operator of engineering machinery (loading machine), Corporal Miodrag RAKOVIĆ,
- Two veterinary technicians from the medical company,
- One veterinary orderly from the medical company,
- One terrain vehicle from headquarters administration for transporting security personnel and one terrain vehicle for transporting other personnel, with two drivers from headquarters administration,

3.- The squad will perform the following tasks during the coming period:

- Locate dead cattle and bury them, applying specified disinfection measures,
- Collect data on locations where bodies of ŠTS /Šiptar /Albanian/ terrorists/ were found, report on these locations to the Chief of MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ Srbica; upon receiving such reports, the latter, via the Chief of MUP Kosovska Mitrovica, will regulate the engagement of personnel for collection, burial, clearing up operations, and keeping the prescribed records on persons buried,
- Provide physical security for forensic medical staff and civilian personnel engaged in clearing up bodies found on the battlefield,
- Kill stray dogs and cats, and follow the same procedure with them as for the carcasses of cattle found there.

4.- The chief of the InSI /Quartermaster Service/ will see to the distribution of work clothes for the clearing up squad and organise the purchase and distribution of the required number of plastic bags.

- 5.- The chief of the VtSI /Veterinary Service/, who is also the deputy commander of the clearing up squad, will issue all necessary veterinary instructions and organise a veterinary reception point and collection point for the animals.
- 6.- The chief of the TSI /Technical Service/ will regulate the reception of TMS /materiel and technical equipment/ collected by the clearing up squad.
- 7.- The chief of the SbSI /Traffic and Transport Service/ will organise the transport of the collected military property and personal effects from the place where they were collected to the storage facility.
- 8.- The chief of the SnSI /Medical Service/ will organise a medical reception point (collection point); he will regulate the purchase of the necessary disinfecting agents for the clearing up operations.
- 9.- Any wounded persons left behind will be given first aid and evacuated to the reception (collection) point for the wounded.
- 10.- Sick and wounded equids will be collected and given assistance, and then sent to the veterinary reception point. Equids which do not require veterinary assistance and are to be slaughtered will be sent to the collection point.
- 11.- The commander of the clearing up squad will report to me daily on implementation of this order during the daily briefing, and at other times as needed.

RK/MP

Made in one original copy
and three carbon copies
and submitted to:

- Commander of the clearing up squad
- Chief of MUP Srbica
- PKPo /Assistant Commander for Logistics/
- Files

COMMANDER
Lieutenant Colonel
/illegible/ /?D/iković
/signed and sealed/

/handwritten:/

for files

121-2

/stamped on top of each page/

37th mtbr /Motorised Brigade/ COMMAND

MILITARY SECRET

Srbica KM /Command Post/

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

1000 hours 4 April 1999

/handwritten:/ Strictly confidential no: 121-2

Copy no. 1

37th mtbr COMMANDER'S ORDER to destroy ŠTS /Šiptar /Albanian/ terrorist
forces/ and take combat control of the territory

SECTION: 1:50,000 Kosovska Mitrovica – 1, 2, 3 and 4.

1. INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY:

NATO forces continued their aggression against our country with air strikes and cruise missile attacks from a distance. They have absolute supremacy in airspace and apart from direct fire support from ŠTS, they are engaged in intensive reconnaissance from airspace. They are using all types of aerial bombs, cluster bombs and ammunition with enriched uranium.

ŠTS were smashed in Drenica, but not completely destroyed. Small groups of terrorists are still present in parts of populated places and wooded parts of the zone, and so far they have been observed in the sectors of Ošljane, Ljubovac, Gornje Prekaze, Mikušnica, Devičke Šume, Gradica, Likovac, Lauša, Gornje Obrinje, Donje Obrinje, Gradica /as printed/, Gladno Selo, Trstenik and Glogovac. Operating in small

groups, they are inflicting losses on MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ and VJ /Yugoslav Army/ units from an ambush and with sniper fire, disrupting regular supplies, introduction /of forces/ and deployment. They are mainly armed with infantry weapons, light PO /anti-tank/ assets and mortars. Expect more intensive action along all axes with the start of the third phase of aggression against our country.

2. UNIT TASK:

The 37th mtbr has the following task: in coordinated action with 252nd okbr /Armoured Brigade/, 15th okbr and Serbian MUP forces, engage in energetic operations to smash and destroy ŠTS in the zone as quickly as possible, secure the main roads and ensure combat control of the territory.

Be on stand-by to defend the assigned zone until further notice.

Supported by AAG-3 /army artillery group/.

KM in the Srbica sector.

3. ADJACENT UNITS:

On the right: 252nd okbr and 7th mtbr to smash and destroy ŠTS.

On the left: 15th okbr to smash and destroy ŠTS.

MUP units, the strength of one platoon, are in the zone and deployed as follows: a group of houses in Brabonjić village, Građevci, Trnavce, Tomislav, Gornja Klina, Srednja Klina, Košutan Mahala, Srbica, Recaj Mala, Novo Selo, Gecaj Mahala, Gradina, Poluža, Makrmalj and Likovac.

4. I HAVE DECIDED:

Introduce and deploy the brigade/s/ in the zone: Obrinje village – Glogovac – Vučitrn – Kosovska Mitrovica (up to but not including), smash and destroy ŠTS in the zone, aiming to fully smash and destroy ŠTS in Gornja Drenica, Mt Čičavica and Kosovo Polje, secure the main roads through the zone and full combat control of the territory and create conditions for unhindered and organised defence. Achieve the goal in two stages in coordinated action with the adjacent forces, MUP forces, fire support, and relying on vantage points and populated places in the zone:

- First phase: smash and destroy ŠTS in the front part of the zone – in Gornja Drenica, paving the way towards taking combat control and organising defence, and
- Second phase: smash and destroy ŠTS in the back part of the zone – on the slopes of Mt Čičavica and in Kosovo Polje, achieving full combat control and ensuring that the roads are passable.

Combat formation: forces deployed to smash and destroy ŠTS, forces for fire support, for PVO, for active operations, the reserve, for logistics support, for command and communications.

Be on stand-by to smash and destroy ŠTS at 0900 hours on 5 April 1999.

4.1. TASKS FOR UNITS:

4.1.1. From the current sector, 1st mtb with tč /tank company/, one 30 mm double-barrelled sPAT /self-propelled anti-aircraft gun/ and one tpoab /anti-tank gun artillery battery/ are being introduced along the Turićevac village, Novo Selo axis and from the Kruševac village - Novo Poljance village – Doševačko Brdo line to smash and destroy ŠTS along the Novo Poljance village – Trstenik village – Glogovac axis. The

task: in an energetic operation, in a coordinated action with the adjacent forces and MUP forces, smash and destroy ŠTS in the assigned zone and as the immediate task, reach the Bok Trstenički – Hajdinović Mahala – Kamenica (tt /trig. point/ 692) line, then continue the operations and reach the Banjica village – Domanek village – k /elevation/ 571 – tt 653 line).

Proceed to take the Banjica village (up to but not including) – Godance village – Trstenik village defence sector.

Right border: k 660 – Makrmalj village (up to but not including) – tt 701 – tt 754 – Dobrostan (up to but not including tt 843).

Left border: Doševac village (up to but not including) – tt 720 – Grabljak (up to but not including tt 772) - Staro Čikatovo – tt 609.

Reinforce the point of convergence on the right and secure the point of convergence on the left.

Support provided by BrAG – 37 /brigade artillery group/.

KM at time of introduction in Grudić Mahala village (school). Next command post in Vrbovac village (school).

4.1.2. From the Tica village – Likovac village (a group of houses to the north) – Bežanić village line, the 2nd mtb with tv /tank platoon/ of the 37th okbr, one self-propelled POLO and one 30mm double-barrelled sPAT are engaged in smashing and destroying ŠTS along the Likovac village – Gornje Obrinje village – Trdevac village axis. The task: in an energetic operation, in a coordinated action with the adjacent forces and MUP forces, smash and destroy ŠTS in the assigned zone and as the immediate task, reach the Ovčarevo village (Drviš hamlet) – Škoza (tt 729) – Donje Obrinje village – Gornje Obrinje village (a group of houses to the north) – Bok

Trstenički (tt 754) line, then continue the operations and reach the Gola Strana – Cerovik village – Trdevac village – Banjica village (up to but not including) line. With some of the forces (up to the strength of one company), in a coordinated action with the 37th and /artillery battalion/ of PVO and the Serbian MUP, from the tt 776 – Delijaj Mahala line block, search for, smash and destroy ŠTS along the Delijaj Mahala – tt 771 – Deviči axis.

Proceed to take the Ratovište – Banjica village – Likovac village defence sector.

Right border: the right border of the brigade zone.

Left border: Makrmalj village (up to and including) – tt 754 – Dobrostan (up to and including tt 843).

Reinforce the point of convergence on the right and secure the point of convergence on the left.

Support provided by BrAG – 37

KM at time of introduction in Makrmalj village. Next KM in Likovac village (school).

4.1.3. From the Baks village – Kožica village line, the 3rd mth with hab /howitzer battery/ of the 105 mm had /howitzer battalion/, one 30 mm double-barrelled sPAT and tv of the 37th okb /armoured battalion/ are engaged in smashing and destroying ŠTS along the Haljitović village – Likošan village – Goluša axis. The task: in an energetic operation, in a coordinated action with the 1st mth, smash and destroy ŠTS in the assigned zone and as the immediate task, reach the Kamenica – tt 624 – Makreš - Fazlovići village – Gradica village line, then continue the operations and reach the tt 653 – Goluša village (k 564) – Podi Godancit (k 812) line. Proceed to march along the Godance village – Prelovce village – Dubovac village axis and organise in-depth defence along in the zone yet to be determined.

Right border: Doševac village (up to but not including) – Grabljak (up to and including tt 772) - Staro Čikatovo (up to but not including) – tt 653.

Left border: the left border of the brigade zone.

Reinforce the point of convergence on the right and secure it on the left.

KM at time of introduction in Čirez village (school). Next KM in Gladno Selo village (group of houses to the north).

4.1.4. First phase: the T-55 (-2) 37th okb /armoured battalion/ with /two/ 30 mm double-barrelled sab /self-propelled artillery batteries/ of PVO, 37th ard of PVO, are engaged in the combat control of the territory along the Vučitrn – Brusnik village axis in coordinated action with the 37th inžb /engineer battalion/, the adjacent units and Serbian MUP units. On stand-by for active combat operations along the Bukoš village – Okraštica village – Hercegovu village, Bukoš village – Nevoljane village and Bukoš village – Vučitrn axes.

tč /tank company/ (minus the platoon) is to return to the battalion on 4 April 1999.

Be on stand-by to carry the tasks in the second phase and organise defence in the zone yet to be determined.

4.1.5. BrAG-37 comprising: 105 mm 37th (-1) had and 37th ard of PVO (-3 and -4).

The commander of BrAG-37; the commander of 37th 105 mm had.

VPo /basic firing position/ in the first phase in the Marina village – Pajrma Marine – k 616 sector.

VPI-1 /as printed/ in the second phase in the Hajdinović Mahala – Trstenik village – Dvoran Mahala sector.

Tasks:

a) first phase:

- supports the operations of the 1st mtb along the Poluža village – Hajdinović Mahala village sector, laying down fire at the request of the 1st mtb commander,
- supports the operations of the 2nd mtb along the Likovac village – Donje Obrinje village – Gornje Obrinje village sector, laying down fire at the request of the 2nd mtb commander.

b) second phase:

- supports the operations of the 1st mtb along the Trstenik village – Glogovac village sector, laying down fire at the request of the 1st mtb commander,
- supports the operations of the 2nd mtb along the Gornje Obrinje village – Trdevac village - Donje Obrinje village – Murga village sector, laying down fire at the request of the 2nd mtb commander.

First phase: KM in Marina village; second phase: in Trstenik village.

Carry out adjustment with Kor.O /expansion unknown/ by combat readiness stage as per the decision of the BrAG-37 commander and NA /Chief of Artillery/.

An observation post as per NA's proposal.

4.1.6. 37th mpoab /mixed anti-tank artillery battalion/ (-1 tpoab /anti-tank gun artillery battery/) is engaged in the following tasks:

- first stage:
- from the road – Kruševac line, with available forces and in coordinated action with 37th ič /reconnaissance company/ and 37th ard of PVO, engaged in blocking, searching for and destroying ŠTS along the Novo Selo village – Kajevec (k 644) – Barjak (tt 759) axis.

With the rest of the forces on stand-by for active combat operations along the Velić village – Donje Prekaze village and Velić Mahala village – Džamijska Mahala – Kraljica axes, and for combat deployment and operations in accordance with the developments.

- second phase:

form a BrPOOd-37 /?Brigade Anti-Armour Detachment/ and take POR /anti-tank sector/ yet to be determined.

KM in the Velić Mahala village.

4.1.7. 37th ard of PVO (-3 and -4) is defending BrAG-37 throughout the time of the assignment.

Assign 1-3, 37th ard of PVO by crew to the motorised battalions.

2-3, 37th ard of PVO is being assigned to 37th okb throughout the time of the assignment.

4/37th ard of PVO is defending the brigade's zone of responsibility through deployment by squads.

First phase – with available forces from the Muslimansko Groblje – Kruševac village line, in coordinated action with 37th mpoad and some units of 2nd mth is engaged in blocking, searching for, smashing and destroying ŠTS along the k 660 – Dević axis. KM in Marina village.

4.1.8. 37th inžb is engaged in the following tasks:

- first phase:

search for, smash and destroy ŠTS along the Galica village – Ljubovac village –

Galica village – Mikušnica village (5 April 1999) and Galica village – Bečić village

and Galica village – Taradža village (6 April 1999) axes, in coordinated action with 37th okbr, at the same time securing a section of the Dubovac village – Brusnik village road.

- second phase:

be on stand-by to secure the introduction of 3rd mtb and ensure combat control of the sector: Čečan – Krš - Galica village – Mikušnica village – Bečić village – tt 770.

In defence, form GOP-37 /Road Maintenance Group/, GDZ -37 /expansion unknown/, an engineer reserve force in the sector to be determined at a later date, and assign one pioneer platoon each /?to the battalion of/ the 1st combat echelon.

KM in Galica village (school).

4.1.9. 37th pozb /Logistics Battalion/ is engaged in logistics support of the brigade, focusing on securing the motorized battalions and BrAG-37, and in within this assignment, on technical and quartermaster supplies and support.

Supply and evacuation routes: Gornja Klina village – Grudić Mahala village – Trstenik village – Glogovac;

Gornja Klina village – Makrmalj village – Likovac village – Obrinje village;

Gornja Klina village – Džamijska Mahala village – Prelovce village – Likošan village;

Gornja Klina village - Džamijska Mahala village – Dubovac village – Galica village and Gornja Klina village – Šipolje village – Svinjare village – Bukoš village.

KM in Gornja Klina village.

4.1.10. 37th čVP /Military Police company/ is engaged in the following tasks:

- with one VP platoon, secures the KM of the brigade,

- with two VP squads, secures the PKM /rear command post/,
- with a platoon of SbVP /Traffic Military Police/, controls traffic and ensures the planned schedule is observed on roads in the zone of responsibility of the brigade, focusing on the Gornja Klina village – Srbica – Glogovac road – Grudić Mahala village; to establish StKSb /traffic control station/ in the crossroads sector near tt 682.
- with one VP platoon, to join the forces for active combat operations and be on stand-by for engagement when required and when the order is issued.
- with one VP squad to form a temporary reception centre for prisoners in the Srbica sector, location as per the decision of the NB /chief of security/ of the 37th mtbr Command.

4.1.11. 37th ič, deployed as forces for active combat operations from the line: a crossroads in Recaj Mahala village – a group of houses (500 metres north of tt 707), engaged in blocking, searching for, smashing and destroying ŠTS along the k 576 – Devička Šuma – Barjak (tt 579) axis in coordinated action with 37th mpoad and Serbian MUP units.

Second phase: be on stand-by to engage in smashing and destroying ŠTS when required and intervene along threatened axes.

4.1.12. 37th čv organises and establishes communications with the 37th mtbr KM and PKM as planned.

4.1.13. 37th KS /headquarters administration/ ensures that life and work of the Command and PJ /headquarters support units/ at KM and PKM of 37th mtbr.

5. APPROVED MTS /materiel and technical equipment/ CONSUMPTION:

The following ammunition, MES /mines and explosives/ and fuel consumption has been approved to carry out the tasks of smashing and destroying ŠTS:

a) infantry ammunition:

- to smash and destroy ŠTS 1 b/k /combat set/
- for defence 1 b/k

b) artillery ammunition, PO /anti-tank/ ammunition and rockets:

- to smash and destroy ŠTS 0.8 b/k
- for defence 1.2 b/k

c) tank ammunition:

- to smash and destroy ŠTS 0.8 b/k
- for defence 1.2 b/k

d) ARJ /artillery rocket unit/ PVO ammunition:

- to smash and destroy ŠTS 0.8 b/k
- for defence 1.2 b/k

e) explosives, PP /anti-personnel/ and PT /anti-tank/ mines – according to special deployment yet to be determined

f) fuel:

- to smash and destroy ŠTS 1 p/r /thankful/
- for defence 0.5 p/r

6. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

KM-37 in the Srbica sector.

IKM /Forward Command Post/ -37 on the sector of tt 682 (Staro Poljance village).

On standby for communications: 0700 hours on 5 April 1999.

Reports:

- regular, daily by 1800 hours, with the situation at 1700 hours.
- interim: on readiness for first phase at 0800 hours on 5 April 1999, and then when required – immediate.

COORDINATED ACTION AND COOPERATION

Organise coordination as follows:

- with 7th pbr – I make of NOONP /Chief of Operations and Training/ responsible,
- with 252nd okbr – I make the 2nd mtb Commander responsible,
- with 15th okbr – I make the 1st mtb Commander and NOONP of 37th mtbr responsible.

Organise cooperation in the zone with Serbian MUP units and carry out specific tasks in coordinated action with them.

Specify all elements of cooperation and coordinated action by 0800 hours on 5 April 1999 at the latest.

BBO/SD

COMMANDER

Lieutenant

One original

Ljubiša DIKOVIĆ

and 15 copies made

/signed and stamped/

and forwarded to:

- files of 37th mtbr Command
- all units

DRAFT TRANSLATION

56. OVERVIEW OF RECORDED CRIMINAL OFFENCES AND MEASURES TAKEN IN THE TERRITORY OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA FROM 1ST JULY 1998 TO 20TH JUNE 1999

9. King Petar the First Street bb, Leposavić, 15th April 1999, causing public danger under Article 187 of KZ RS

Causing public danger which is an offence under Article 187 of KZ RS took place on 20th April 1999. The perpetrator was Vulović Bojan (a member of the reserve force of the Yugoslav Army), who came from the village of Ostraće in Leposavić municipality.

A criminal complaint of 15th April 1999 the number of which was KU 11/99 was filed and submitted to the Office of military prosecutor in Priština.

10. Lipljan, the villages of Gornje /Slovinje/ and Donje Slovinje, 15th April 1999

On 15th April 1999, intelligence activities of the police resulted in obtaining information according to which there were mass graves in the villages of Gornje /Slovinje/ and Donje Slovinje in Lipljan municipality. Allegedly, around 35 bodies were buried in the mass graves and the buried people had most likely died in fighting between KLA and security forces which had taken place in that area.

The existence of the graves was confirmed after the information had been checked and authorities of the Yugoslav Army were informed accordingly. They disinterred 16 bodies, identified them, and turned them over to their relatives for funeral.

Even though searches had been conducted, the grave in Gornje Slovinje was never found.

We have no knowledge of any other actions that the Yugoslav Army might have undertaken.

The case file and pertinent documents were filed with the Office of the District Public Prosecutor in Priština.

11. Đakovica, 16th April 1999, rape under Article 103 of KZ RS

Several members of the Yugoslav Army raped Nezira Merlinde of the village of Bardonjić and Beriša Hasime of the village of Koserić. The incident occurred in the village of Crmljane on 16th April 1999 at around 1000 hours.

They took a sum of 3,130 DM in an unlawful way from the following people: Šefki Krasnići, Sejdi Krasnići, and Đulfedana Krasnići, all of whom came from the village of Vranovac, from Zoje Hisenaj, Škurta Hiseni, and Miruše Hisenaj, all of whom came from the village of Bradonjić, from Meme Krasnići from the village of Čelopek, Arif Kereći from the village of Kraljane, and from Kimeta Berišu of Čelopek.

These civilians requested that members of the Ministry of the Interior should give them protection.

The security authorities of the Army were notified of the incidents, as was the Staff of the Ministry of the Interior.

12. Rezalo, Srbica, 18th April 1999

According to information two members of the Yugoslav Army, captain Krsmanović and major Čorbić, supplied to the Secretariat of the Interior in Kosovska Mitrovica on 13th April 1999, several dozen bodies, between 30 and 40 of them, were lying nearby the village cemetery in the village of Rezalo. The bodies had been covered up by earth and rubble by members of the Yugoslav Army.

Investigating Magistrate Paunović Bogoljub of the District Court in Kosovska Mitrovica and authorised officers with the Secretariat of the Interior went to the crime scene on the same day. An investigation of the scene proved that nearby the village cemetery there was a deposit of earth, and after the first layer had been removed, human bodies were discovered. The aforementioned Investigating Magistrate refused to issue exhumation orders since damage might have been caused to the bodies.

Investigating Magistrate Miletić Blagoje of the District in Court in Kosovska Mitrovica and authorised officers went to the scene of the crime on 18th April 1999. After having examined the scene of the crime, they established that there were a large number of human bodies lying underneath the deposit of earth. The Investigating Magistrate refused to issue orders for exhumation of the bodies; instead, he issued orders that since the existing deposit was located at a water-worn gully, one more layer of

approximately 80 cm of earth be deposited over it. At the same time, he insisted with attending officers with the Yugoslav Army, namely with captain Krsmanović and major Čorbić, that investigative activities should be carried out by investigative authorities of the Army. Files containing findings of forensic investigation were compiled.

13. Lipljan, the villages of Malo Ribare and Mali Alaš, 18th/19th April 1999

Activities of the police had led to information that was obtained on 18th and 19th April 1999. According to the information, there were mass graves located in the villages of Malo Ribare and Mali Alaš in Lipljan municipality and approximately 45 bodies were buried in those graves. They belonged to people who had died during operations of VJ units.

After the information had been checked and confirmed, the competent authorities of the Yugoslav Army were informed of the incident. They disinterred and identified 25 bodies in Malo Ribare and 16 bodies in Mali Alaš.

The bodies were handed over to their relatives so that they could be given a burial.

We have no information about any other measures that VJ might have undertaken in this case.

14. Zubin Potok, 22nd April 2000, Arsenije Čarnojević's Street bb, murder under Article 47 of KZ RS

On 22nd April 1999, at around 2200 hours, Kasalović Dragan of the village of Zupče in Zubin Potok municipality, who served as a sergeant in the Yugoslav Army, fired shots from a 7.62-mm calibre automatic rifle and killed Biševac Mirko of Zubin Potok. Biševac was the owner of café "Hram" /Temple/ in which the murder occurred. At the same time, Kasalović inflicted bodily harm on Jakšić Dragoljub, Vukićević Zoran, Đurić Slaviša, Radojković Boban, Nešović Gordana, and Radomirović Snežana.

A criminal complaint KU 24/00 was filed against Kasalović Dragan because there were reasonable grounds to suspect that he had committed the offence of murder under Article 47, paragraph 2, item 3 of KZ RS. The criminal complaint was submitted to the Office of the District Public Prosecutor in Kosovska Mitrovica. Kasalović Dragan turned himself in to military authorities in Niš and he was remanded in custody there. The investigative authorities of the Army instituted criminal proceedings.

15. Obilić, 23rd April 1999, attempted robbery under Article 168 of KZ RS and offence under Article 23 of ZOJRM /Law on Public Law and Order/

Milenković Momir, who was a member of the reserve force of the Yugoslav Army, and three individuals of Albanian ethnic affiliation took 2,020.0 dinars and 200 DM from Gaši Muharem while threatening him with a knife.

The perpetrators were placed in detention.

A criminal complaint was filed and laid in the competent Prosecutor Office.

16. Peć, 26th April 1999, causing public danger under Article 187 of KZ RS

On 26th April 1999, several members of the Yugoslav Army discharged an automatic rifle in the direction of a building in which families Grujić, Martinović, Jekinić, etc. lived, and which was located in Rasadnik settlement. One projectile entered the bedroom of the Jekinić family. The perpetrator was identified as Novović Jovica, who was a soldier.

The Military Police were notified of the incident.

An official note PU 510/99 and a questionnaire that contained information related to the incident PU 2895/99 were referred to the Yugoslav Army. A report was submitted to the Ministry of the Interior.

/For handwritten numbers: see original/ /Handwritten: op /?Operative/

COMMAND of the 37th mtbr /Motorised Brigade/ **MILITARY SECRET**
Srbica KM /Command Post/ **STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**
1200 hours, 13 April 1999

/Handwritten: *strictly confidential* 125-2/

Copy number _____ /?1/_____
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ORDER FOR DEFENCE **Operative number 125-2**

SECTION 1:50,000 Kosovska Mitrovica – 1, 2, 3 and 4

1.- THE AGGRESSOR

After initiating the aggression on the FRY /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ on 24 March 1999, the forces of the aggressor, the US-led NATO alliance, struck all vital, military and civilian installations with aircraft and cruise missiles. Despite the losses sustained so far (32 aircraft, some 50 cruise missiles and 88 men), the aggression continues, predominantly from the air.

The aggressor moved fresh forces based in Greece and Italy on time and then prepared and grouped them as follows:

In the Republic of Macedonia: parts of the German, British, French, American and Dutch forces, and 12 combat He /helicopters/, 12 multi-role and 22 TrHe /transport helicopters/, and parts of the ŠTS /Šiptar /Albanian/ Terrorist Forces/ (3,000-4,000 men).

Parts of units numbering some 5,000-6,000 men and some 10,000 ŠTS from KiM /Kosovo and Metohija/ trained by NATO instructors for DTA /sabotage and terrorist operations/ were brought together in Albania.

Based on the current deployment and grouping of forces, an attack by the main forces can be expected from the RM /Republic of Macedonia/ on the following axes: Kumanovo-Bujanovac, Skopje-Đeneral Janković, Tetovo-Globočica and Gostivar-Restelica, and with the auxiliary forces from the RA /Republic of Albania/ on the axes: Kukës-Prizren, Krumë-Đakovica and Tropoje-Dečane.

The goal of the enemy's attack is to use strong aerial forces with the support of KR /cruise missiles/, aircraft and helicopters for POB /anti-armour combat/, NHO /nuclear and chemical weapons/, special airborne assault forces, coordinate with the remains of the ŠTS in KiM, and simultaneously carry out a land strike using forces from the RM and RA, scatter our defence forces in KiM, drive them out of Kosovo and Metohija and achieve the objective of declaring it /Kosovo/ a protectorate.

The enemy will probably achieve its objective in two phases.

First phase: Under strong cover by aircraft and KR, using aircraft and helicopters for POB, NH /nuclear and chemical/ weapons, and concentrated armoured and PO /anti-

armour/ forces, the first b/e /combat echelon/, will spearhead the defence on the main attack axes and then employ THD /tactical helicopter landings/ in the sector of Končuljanska Klisura /gorge/, Mučibaba, Doganović village, Štrpce village and the Dulje pass, and coordinating with the remnants of the local ŠTS, continue an energetic thrust and as quickly as possible take the dominant features along the axis: Bujanovac-Gnjilane-Uroševac-Mt. Nerodimka-Mt. Žar-Mt. Milanovac-Mt. Grebnik-Mt. Suva.

Time to complete the first phase: four to six days.

Second phase: Introducing the second b/e along with an operational assault in the sector of Malo Kosovo and the sector of Kosovo Polje-Slatina, and continuing with a brisk operation focusing on the axis Gnjilane-Gračanica-Priština and Uroševac-Priština, as quickly as possible, take the axis Bujanovac-Kosovska Kamenica-Novo Brdo-Batlava-Merdare-Prepolac-Zvečane-Mt. Prokletija and the Čahor pass.

Time to complete the second phase: five to seven days.

Support: Expect the enemy to have the following support for achieving his objective:

Air support:

- 100 LBA /fighters-bombers/ flying some 350 sorties;
- some 150 KR and 30 A-10 aircraft for anti-armour combat;
- three groups of 12 combat helicopters;
- some 20 multi-role helicopters;
- some 50 transport He.

NH support:

- mass use of chemical weapons;
- projectiles with depleted uranium.

Regardless of the strong air support, support from aircraft and helicopters for anti-armour combat and use of NH weapons, there is little likelihood of achieving the objective with the existing forces.

Expect minor ŠTS forces in the following sectors of the Brigade's zone of defence: Ovčarevo village, Petrovica, Kosmač, Drenica and Čičavica; they will predominantly attack lone motor vehicles and small convoys with sniper fire, ambushes and surprise attacks, with a simple objective in support of the NATO aggression against the FRY of inflicting as much damage as possible to the Brigade's units, prevent securing and organising the assigned zones, instil insecurity and fear, and hamper the regular and safe supply of the units, delivery and evacuation.

2.- THE TASK OF THE BRIGADE

Organise a defence in the zone of Kukavica (up to but not including tt. /trig point/ 591)-Gradina (up to but not including tt. 1055)-the Goleš pass (up to but not including)-Suvo Brdo (up to and including tt. 734).

Task: establish combat control of the territory in the zone of defence, cover parts of the 125th mtbr and be prepared for PDB /?anti-sabotage combat/ in the sector of Magure and a counterattack on the axis: Glogovac-Banja-Suva Reka-Prizren.

Supported by the /? First/ 52nd KAG /Corps Artillery Group//

KM in Banjica village.

3.- ADJACENT UNITS:

The defence to our right will be organised by the 7th pbr /Infantry Brigade/ with the 62nd TOd /Territorial Detachment/, with the task: cover parts of the 125th mtbr, coordinate with the 252nd okbr /Armoured Brigade/, 37th mtbr and forces of the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ of the Republic of Serbia and with a decisive defence inflict as much damage to the aggressor as possible, sap his striking power and stop him on the line: Mt. Suva-Mt. Grebnik. Be prepared for a counterattack on the axes: Đurakovac-Peć and Klina-Dečane and make a counter-strike by the forces of the Corps possible.

The defence to our left will be organised and carried out by the 15th okbr with the task: establish control of the general sector of Priština, coordinate with the 37th mtbr, TG-252 /Tactical Group/, 36th OdPJP /Detachment of Special Police Units/, 86th trod /Territorial Detachment/ of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia, organise PDB in the general sector of Kosovo Polje. With a part of the forces coordinate PDB with the 211th okbr in the sector of Malo Kosovo. Be prepared for a counterattack on the axis: Štimlje-Suva Reka-Prizren-Kukës and Priština-Uroševac-Kačanik.

The defence in front of us will be organised by the 252nd okbr, with the task: cover parts of the 125th mtbr and 549th mtbr, coordinate with the 37th mtbr, 7th pbr and 549th mtbr, with a decisive defence inflict as much damage as possible to the aggressor, scatter his attack and stop him on the axis: Labučevo village-Orahovac.

Be prepared for a counterattack on the axis: Klina-Dakovica-Prušit and Đakovica-Prizren.

4.- DECISION:

I have decided: Organise a defence in the assigned zone by grouping the g/s /main forces/ on the axis Orlate village-Glogovac and the p/s /auxiliary forces/ on the axis Dobra Voda village-Staro Poljance village, with the objective: with supporting points at suitable land features and in populated areas, undertaking PVO /anti-aircraft defence/ and direct and combat security measures, fortification and engineering works at the positions, protect the men and SRT /combat hardware/ from airstrikes by NATO aircraft rockets and from losses by ŠTS activities in the zone, establish combat control of the territory and unrestricted passage on the main roads, organise cover for parts of the 125th mtbr and with a part of the forces be prepared for PDB in the Magure sector.

Then be prepared for a p/n /counterattack/ on the axis Glogovac-Banja village-Suva Reka-Prizren. Achieve the objective by coordinating with adjacent units and units of the MUP in the zone and with the support of the PrK /Priština Corps/.

Combat deployment: in two echelons – support forces, PVO forces, POB forces, forces for securing the roads and combat control of the territory, engineer forces, IP /Reconnaissance Patrol/ and IG /Reconnaissance Groups/, PoOb /Logistical Support/ forces, command and communications forces.

Have the p/k /forward defence line/ of the first position on the axis: Veliki Đurdevik village-Pločica village-Balince village-Orlate village.

Have the p/k of the second position on the axis: Morina village-Vrbovac village-Glogovac-Lipoglav.

Stand by for defence at 0600 hours on 16 April 1999.

5.- TASKS OF THE UNITS:

5.1.- The 1st mtb /Motorised Battalion/ with a Pioneer Platoon of the 37th inžb /Engineer Battalion/ shall secure and defend the sector: Rahišta-Beriša village-Lapušnik village (Tahirović Mahala). Task: coordinate with the 2nd mtb and forces of the MUP to ensure combat control of the territory and that the segment of road from Komorane village to Orlate village is clear, cover parts of the 125th mtbr while they withdraw via the defence sector, protect the men and SRT against airstrikes and ŠTS activities from Mt. Kosmač and Drenica and standby for a p/n on the Orlate village-Banja village-Suva Reka axis.

Right boundary: tt. 703 (up to and including) – Gradina (up to and including tt. 937)

Left boundary: the left boundary of the zone of the Brigade.

Reinforce the right juncture, secure the left.

Supported by the 37th BrAG /Brigade Artillery Group/.

KM in the Orlate village sector (Bujub Mahala – the school).

5.2.- The 2nd mtb with the hab/37had 105mm /Howitzer Battery of the 37th Battalion of 105mm Howitzers/ and a pionv /Pioneer Platoon/37th inžb shall secure and protect the sector: Veliki Đurdevik village-Pločica village-Ovčarevo village (Aručaj hamlet). Task: coordinate with the 1st mtb, the 1st Battalion of the 7th pbr and forces of the MUP to secure combat control of the territory in the defence sector and keep the roads clear on the Murgare village-Trdevac village and Murgare village-Gornje Obrinje village-Likovac village axes, cover parts of the 125th mtbr withdrawing via your defence sector, protect the men and SRT against airstrikes and ŠTS activities from Mts. Grbenička and Petrovica, and Ovčarevo village, and stand by for a p/n on the Kijevo village-Mališevo village-Studenčane village-Prizren axis.

Right boundary: the right boundary of the zone of the Brigade.

Left boundary: tt. 703 (up to and including) – Gradina (up to and including tt. 937).

Reinforce the right juncture, secure the left.

Supported by the 37th BrAG with firepower from the VpPr /expansion unknown/ firing position/.

KM in the Dobra Voda village sector.

5.3.- The 3rd mtb shall take and defend the sector of Glogovac-Lipoglav-Dobroševac.

Task: coordinate with the 37th okb /Armoured Battalion/, 2nd Battalion of the 15th okbr, 37th inžb and 37th mpoad /Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion/ to ensure combat control of the territory in the sector of defence and keep the roads clear on the Komorane village-Goleš pass and Dobroševac village-Likošan village-Prelovce village axes, protect the men against airstrikes and ŠTS activities from Mt. Čičavica, Gornji Grabovac village and Krši Kules, and stand by for PDB on the axes Pomazatin village-Mali Belačevac village-Ence village and Krši Kules-Bljeništa-Trešnjevo village-Šumica.

Right boundary: Globare village-Bradići village.

Left boundary: the left boundary of the zone of the Brigade.

Reinforce the right juncture and secure the left.

Supported by the 37th BrAG.

KM in Vasiljevo village sector.

5.4.- The 37th okb and the 3rd /Company/ of the 37th ardPVO /Anti-Aircraft Defence Artillery Battalion/ (-1) shall secure and defend the sector of Morina village-Vrbovačko Brdo-Kraljica.

Task: coordinate with the 37th pozb /Logistics Battalion/, 37th inžb and forces of the MUP to ensure combat control of the territory in the sector of defence and keep the road segments clear on the axes Staro Poljance village-Brusnik village and Poluža village-Likovac village, protect the men and SRT against airstrikes and ŠTS activities from Devičke Šume, Baks village and Bečić village, and stand by for PDB with forces of one company on the Glogovac village-Goleš pass-Ence village axis.

Stand by for a/d /offensive operations/ on the axes: Staro Poljance village-Novo Selo village-Lauša village; /illegible to end of page/

Then take part in the p/n on the axis: Orlate village-Banja village-Suva Reka-Prizren.

Right boundary: tt. 771 (up to but not including) – tt. 725 (up to and including).

Left boundary: tt. 733 (up to and including) – Del. /expansion unknown/.

Reinforce the right juncture and secure the left.

KM in the sector of Novo Poljance village.

5.5.- The 37th BrAG consisting of the 37th Howitzer Battalion 105mm (-1) and the 37th ardPVO (-3 and 4).

The commander of the 37th BrAG, the commander of the 37th had 105mm.

VPo /basic firing position/ in the sector of Krajkovo village-k. /elevation/ 614 – road junction.

VPP /temporary firing position/ in the sector of Lokma Mahala-Plavić Mahala-Negrovce village.

Tasks:

- support the battle with BOs /combat security/ on the axes Laški Drenovac-Balince village and Ladvovac village-Trpeza village.
- support cover for the 2nd Battalion of the 252nd okbr on the axis: Crni Lug village-Orlate village,
- support the defence of the 1st mtb on the axes Laški Drenovac village-Vrhnica village, Crni Lug village-Orlate village and Klečka village-Beriša village,
- support the defence of the 2nd mtb on the axis Kijevo village-Cerovik village,

- prevent the enemy from breaching and wedging himself in the Sedlare village-Komorane village axis,
- support the fighting against remnants of the ŠTS and /?provide appropriate support for/ taking the defence positions in the sectors of Mt. Kosmač, Kodra Priboj and Mt. Drenica,
- support the Brigade's PDB forces in the sectors of Široko Polje, Mt. Drenica, the Goleš pass and Globare village.

Make adjustments with the KorO /adjustment piece/ until readiness for defence as per decision and recommendation of the NA /Chief of Artillery/.

The Artillery's plan of action, type of fire and expenditure of ammunition as per the Order for Artillery from the NA of the Command of the 37th mtbr.

Observation post as per decision of the NA.

Protect the men and SRT against airstrikes and the ŠTS from Mt. Kosmač and keep the road segment on the Ljek Mahala-Krajkovo village-Tahirović Mahala-Lapušnik village axis clear.

KM in the sector of Krajkovo village.

5.6- The 37th BrPOOd /?Brigade Anti-Tank Detachment/ consisting of the 37th mpoad, pionv/37th inžb and the 1-3/37th ardPVO.

Commander of the 37th BrPOOd, commander of the 37th mpoad.

Secure the POR /anti-tank sector/ in the sector of Novo Čikatovo village-Glogovac-k. 571.

Task: Be on standby for POB on the axes: Glogovac-Komorane village-Orlate village and Glogovac-Komorane village-Nekovce village.

Prepare and organise POP-1 /anti-tank position/ in the sector of Obrija village-Zogići village, taking it from the axis Novo Čikatovo village-Donji Zabel village-Komorane village on the signal "Lisica" /Fox/.

Prepare and organise POP-2 in the sector of Lapušnik village-Bokrin, taking it from the axis Novo Čikatovo village-Komorane village-Lapušnik village on the signal "Vuk" /Wolf/.

Barrier line no. 1 Kišna Reka village - Donja Fuštica village

Barrier line no. 2 Fuša-Lapušnik village.

Protect the men and SRT against airstrikes and keep the road segments clear on the Novo Čikatovo village-Banjica village-Trdevac village and Novo Čikatovo village-Donja Koretica village-Komorane village axes.

KM in the sector of Novo Čikatovo village.

5.7.- The 37th ardPVO (-3 and 4) shall protect the 37th BrAG for the duration of the task.

The 1-3/37th ardPVO shall be attached to the 37th BrPOOd, and the 2-3/37th ard PVO shall be attached to the 37th okb for the duration of the task.

According to the /?troop deployment order/, the 4/37th ardPVO will defend the Brigade's z/o.

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During the day and in conditions of good visibility, keep the VP /firing position/ in populated areas, valleys and in sectors with wooded areas obscured from view and airstrikes. At night and in conditions of poor visibility, take up a number of ambush VP in a row, concentrated and grouped for barrage fire on the command of the commanders of basic firing units, selected from among the active officers. All other matters as per the Order for PVO of the Command of the 37th mtbr.

KM in the sector of Domanek village.

5.8.- 37th inžb (-pionč /Pioneer Company/) shall carry out the following tasks:

a) preparing for defence:

- support the fortification of the 37th BrAG and the 37th okb by excavating for artillery weapons and tank shelters,
- support the fortification of the 1st and 2nd mtb by making trenches and roads on the defence p/k,
- prepare and organise obstacles on the POB barrier lines and support the battalions of the first echelon in setting up obstacles in front of the p/k,
- organise and carry out PDZ /?anti-airborne assault protection/ by sector in accordance with the special plan for anti-airborne assault obstacles.

b) defending:

- form the 37th GOP /Road Maintenance Group/ for repairing roads on the axes Glogovac village-Komorane village and Novo Čikatovo village-Srbica,
- form the 37th GZ /Obstacle Construction Group/ with the strength of a pionč (-1) for making the preparations and destroying installations on the axes Glogovac-Komorane village; Komorane-the Goleš pass and Komorane-Orlate,
- with the remaining forces, form an engineer reserve in the sector of Trstenik village.

Protect the men and SRT against airstrikes and the ŠTS from the direction of Dobrostan and Kamenica, provide combat control for a part of the territory in the z/o and keep the road clear on the axes Trstenik village-Poluža village and Trstenik village-Glogovac.

Move out of the current deployment sector in small parties on 14 and 15 April 1999 in accordance with the plan for moving to be made by the Commander of the 37th inžb.

Incorporate the Pioneer platoons by no later than 1200 hours on 15 April 1999.

All other engineering tasks as per the plan of the inž.d /Engineer Division/ and the order for the Engineers.

KM in the Trstenik village sector.

5.9.- 37th pozb (-snč /Medical Company/) shall be deployed in the sector of Venac-Srbica-Novo Selo village.

Task: provide the Brigade with logistical support, focus on the tasks of technical supply, maintenance and quartermaster support.

Keep the focus of PoOb /logistical support/ on the battalions of the first b/e, 37th BrAG, 37th BrPOOd and 37th okb, then on the other units.

The supply and evacuation routes: Srbica-Glogovac-Komorane-Orlate and Srbica-Makrmalj-Likovac-Gornje Obrinje village-Trdevac-Cerovik village.

The snč/37th pozb shall be deployed in the sector of Komorane village and provide medical support tasks for the units of the Brigade.

Protect the men, SRT, material reserves and UBS /lethal assets/ against airstrikes and ŠTS activities from the axes of Lauš village, Donje Prekaze village and Devičke Šume /Woods/ and provide combat control for the deployment sector.

Move from the current sector on 14 and 15 April 1999, no later than 1500 hours.

All other matters concerning PoOb shall be regulated per item by an order for logistical support.

5.10.- The 37th čVP /Military Police Company/ shall carry out the following tasks:

- with a platoon of VP secure the Brigade KM,

- with two squads of VP secure the Brigade PKM /Rear Command Post/
 - with a platoon of SbVP /Traffic Military Police/ control traffic and enforce the planned regime and use of roads in the Brigade's z/o, focusing on the Srbica village-Glogovac village-Komorane-Orlate road. Set up a StKSb /Traffic Control Checkpoint/ in the sector of the road junctions in Komorane village.
 - include one platoon of VP in the forces for a/d and stand by for engagement on demonstrated need and assigned task.
 - with one squad of VP form a temporary holding centre for prisoners at a site in the Srbica sector according the decision of the NB /Chief of Security/ of the Command of the 37th mtbr.
- Provide security for moving the Command of the 37th mtbr on the axis Srbica-Glogovac-Banjica village on time and according to the plan for moving the Command, which is to be made later.

5.11.- The 37th ič /Reconnaissance Company/ shall carry out the following tasks:

- form the 1st IP with the strength of a reconnaissance platoon (-1) for reconnaissance and control of the territory on the axis: Bradići village-Kožica village and Bardići village-Gredica village,
 - form the 2nd IP with the strength of a reconnaissance platoon (-1) for reconnaissance and control of the territory on the axis Likovac village-Rezala village and Likovac village-Gornje Obrinje village.
- Keep the remainder of the forces on stand-by at the KM of the 37th mtbr for engagement on the order for intelligence security and the order for the engagement of the 37th ič.

5.12.- The 37th čv /Communications Company/ shall organise and establish the planned communications with the KM and PKM of the 37th mtbr.

5.13.- The 37th KS /Headquarters Administration/ shall provide trouble-free living and working conditions for the Command and PJ /Headquarters Support Units/ at the KM 37th mtbr.

6. EXPENDITURE OF MTS /materiel and technical equipment/, AMMUNITION AND MES /mines and explosives/

Ammunition:

- | | |
|------------------------------------------|---------------------|
| - ammunition for infantry weapons | 3 b/k /combat sets/ |
| - ammunition for artillery support | 3 b/k |
| - ammunition for PO artillery | 2 b/k |
| - rockets | 1 b/k |
| - PVO ammunition | 1.5 b/k |
| - tank ammunition | 2 b/k |

Fuel:

- | | |
|----------------|------------------|
| - petrol | 2 p/r /tankfuls/ |
| - diesel | 2 p/r |

Explosives, PP /anti-personnel/ and PT /anti-tank/ mines per special schedule to be made later.

7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

KM in the sector of Banjica village.

PKM in the sector of Srbica.

Have communications ready at 0400 hours on 16 April 1999.

Reports:

- regular, daily by 1800 hours with the situation as of 1700 hours,
- interim, as required

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8. COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

Coordinate as follows:

- with the 7th pbr, for which I make responsible the NOONP /Chief of Operations and Training/,
- with the 252nd okbr, for which I make responsible the Commanders of the 1st and 2nd mtb,
- with the 15th okbr, for which I make responsible the Commander of the 3rd mtb.

Organising coordination and agreement on plans for artillery fire shall be made with the first 52nd KAG by the NA of the Command of the 37th mtbr.

The coordination of units subordinated to the Brigade shall be regulated by the Commanders of the subordinated units per place, task, time and objective of the operation.

The basis for coordination shall be set during command reconnaissance on 14 April 1999.

Cooperate with the units of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia in the zone of responsibility.

Work out precisely all the elements of coordination and cooperation by the deadline for readiness for defence.

BBO/SD

COMMANDER
Lieutenant Colonel
Ljubiša DIKOVIĆ
/signed and stamped/

One original,

14 copies,

to:

- 1 x a/a /files/
- 1 x all units

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**COMMAND OF THE 37th mtbr /Motorised Brigade/
Strictly confidential no. 9 – 16
16 April 1999**

REGULAR COMBAT REPORT

**To: PRIŠTINA CORPS COMMAND
COMMAND/S/ of the 2ND A. /Army/ and UK /Užice Corps/, for information**

4. – SITUATION IN THE TERRITORY

During the entire day (till the dispatch of this report), there were intensive NATO overflights over the Brigade's zone of responsibility and the deployment sectors of the Brigade's units. There were no direct attacks at our units.

5. – ACTIVITIES AND MORALE IN THE UNIT

5.1. – Activities

During the day The Brigade Commander attended a meeting in the PrK /Priština Corps/ Command on the coordination of operations to crush and destroy the ŠTS /Šiptar /Albanian/ terrorist forces/ in the Čičavica sector.

A commander's reconnaissance was carried out with the commanders of the units in order to lay down precisely and concretely the tasks in order to crush and destroy the ŠTS in the Čičavica sector. The commander's reconnaissance was carried out by: the Brigade Commander on the primary and the NŠ/Chief of Staff/ on the secondary axis of engagement of the Brigade's forces.

In the night between 15 and 16 April the ŠTS attempted to cross from mountain Drenica to mountain Kosmač via Lapušnik village. They were prevented from doing so by the action of the 1st mtb /Motorised Battalion/ and MUP /Ministry of the Interior/.

From 0500 hours to 1000 hours a part of the Brigade's units occupied the line of blockade to destroy the ŠTS on mountain Čičavica as follows: from "94" to "73" and from "2" to "4" and from "3" to "13" (on the coded map). While carrying out the occupation of the line of blockade in the general "79" area, 20 ŠTS members were killed. The others withdrew to sectors 93 and 102.

5.2. – Situation:

The morale situation in the Brigade's units is stable.

The security situation in the Brigade's units is good. A census of the civilian population in Srbica has been conducted and movement in the zone of responsibility has been regulated by an order of the Brigade's Command.

6. – LOGISTICS SUPPORT

The units were replenished during the day with foodstuffs, fuel and ammunition as requested by the commanders of the units.

8. – MAIN TASKS FOR TOMORROW

- Carry out combat operations to crush and destroy the ŠTS in the Čičavica sector.
- Continue with the occupation of the sector of defence with the battalions of the 1st b/e /combat echelon/.

9. – REQUESTS:

- in accordance with the request we submitted to you, recruit the missing number of officers for the Brigade Command;
- you need to supply us with all SRT /war materiel/ we requested from you in our combat reports from 9 to 14 April 1999;
- we inform you that weapons, ammunition, MES /mines and explosives/, fuel and SRT have been moved and redeployed out of the *Ibarski rudari* Barracks.

RS/RS

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COMMAND
PRIŠTINA CORPS

_____ no. _____

_____ /illegible/ _____

DATE PLACE TIME	DESCRIPTION OF EVENT	SIGNATURE OF PERSON ENTERING DATA	NOTES	DATE PLACE TIME	DESCRIPTION OF EVENT	SIGNATURE OF PERSON ENTERING DATA	NOTES
KOSOVO POLJE 15 April 1999	The following equipment remains at the barracks: PRAGA self-propelled anti-aircraft gun Two items TU /acronym unknown/ One item /illegible/ One item 122mm BM multiple launch rocket system One item T-55 tank Two items M80 BVP /infantry fighting vehicle/ Five items Preparations are underway to move this equipment out of the barracks. We received a task from the Command of Čitavica /illegible/ and are working on /illegible/ the decision and preparing units to carry it out.	MBI- COMMANDER Colonel MLADEN ČIRKOVIĆ	/signature illegible/	KOSOVO POLJE 16 April 1999	During the night the NATO Air Force did not target brigade units. During the day /illegible/ the NATO Air Force attacked the Slatina airport. Based on the task received, commanders of the 2nd okb /armoured battalion/, the 1st okb and the 1st mb conducted command reconnaissance. Together with the commander of the logistics battalion we conducted the reconnaissance of the new deployment sectors of our units. During the day elements of the units were relocated: ČTOd /company of the territorial detachment/ - Obilić northeast (/illegible/ RO /work organisation/), ČTSu /acronym unknown/—the village of Grace, Suć /acronym unknown/ Obilić. Other units are in their previous deployment sectors. Units of the engineers battalion continued to construct PD /anti-sabotage/ barriers in the defence sector. Other units are in their previous deployment sectors focusing on protection from air attacks and control of...	/signature illegible/	/stamp/

DATE PLACE TIME	DESCRIPTION OF EVENT	SIGNATURE OF PERSON ENTERING DATA	NOTES	DATE PLACE TIME	DESCRIPTION OF EVENT	SIGNATURE OF PERSON ENTERING DATA	NOTES
16 April 1999 KOSOVO POLJE	<p>... the territory and lines of communication, which they carry out in their deployment sectors. Part of the equipment /illegible/ was handed over to the 2nd mb.</p> <p>Activities of logistical units are aimed at repairing and relocating the RMR /war equipment and materiel/. Communication with units is difficult. We are working on repairing the damage caused by bombardment and establishing communication with all units. There were no losses in personnel. New soldiers were recruited into the units for the needs of the Čičavica operation.</p> <p>MBI-</p> <p>COMMANDER Colonel MLADEN ČIRKOVIĆ</p>	/signature illegible/		17 April 1999 KOSOVO POLJE	<p>During the night the NATO Air Force did not target our units. Communications with subordinate units are conducted by switching on PTT numbers. We are communicating with the 2nd mb via channel 34.</p> <p>Units of the 2nd okb and the 1st okb are carrying out tasks in keeping with the decision of the Čičavica commander. In the course of combat operations our units suffered no losses in personnel or combat hardware. MUP units carried out coordinated action with our units and participated in the clearing up of the territory. The operation was partially completed by nightfall, combat operations will continue tomorrow.</p> <p>Other units are in their previous deployment sectors focusing on securing the territory and the lines of communication. We continued to fortify and deploy our units in keeping with the decision on defence. During the day</p> <p>/illegible/...</p>	/signature illegible/	/stamp/

DATE PLACE TIME	DESCRIPTION OF EVENT	SIGNATURE OF PERSON ENTERING DATA	NOTES	DATE PLACE TIME	DESCRIPTION OF EVENT	SIGNATURE OF PERSON ENTERING DATA	NOTES
KOSOVO POLJE 17 April 1999	<p>... eight military conscripts arrived and were assigned to the units. A group of soldiers worked with Lieutenant Colonel Branislav RADOVIĆ on unearthing the remains of private KASUMOVIĆ from the debris at the barracks. There were no losses in personnel or equipment and materiel. We had no problems with the supply of our units.</p> <p>MB1-</p> <p>COMMANDER Colonel MLADEN ĆIRKOVIĆ</p>	/signature illegible/		KOSOVO POLJE 18 April 1999	<p>During the night the NATO Air Force attacked targets in the brigade's zone of responsibility. Our units suffered no losses and there were no losses in personnel. Units (elements of the units) of the 2nd okb, 1st okb and 1st mb continued to carry out the Cicavica operation. They continued to carry out tasks on Mount Drenica in the villages of /illegible/ and /illegible/ with some elements of the 2nd okb and the 1st mb participating in the siege.</p> <p>We also continued to carry out the task of relocating equipment from the barracks. Other units deployed in their sectors are focusing on securing the territory, controlling the lines of communication and protecting units and personnel from air attacks.</p> <p>According to the report by the commander of the 1st okb, corporal Ratko BOŽIĆ and private Milan ĆIRIĆ were injured by a piece of shrapnel fired by the STS.</p>	/signature illegible/	/stamp/

DEPLOYMENT OF PJP /Special Police Unit/ IN THE AREA
on 17 April 1999

I Secretariat in Priština

1. 36th Detachment PJP

- 1st Company: Banja - Mališevo
- 2nd Company: Gornja and Donja Fuštica
- 3rd Company: Kriva Reka - Nekovce
- 4th Company: Trpeza - Ladrovce
- 5th Company: Gornji Žabelj - Stankovce
- 6th Company: Banjica - Sedlare

2. 86th Detachment PJP

- 1st Company: Lapušnik - Orlate - Đurdica
- 2nd Company: Glogovac - Poluža (in the direction of Trstenik)
- 3rd Company: Glogovac (farming cooperative) - Staro Čikatovo (school) - T
- 4th Company: Poklek - Komorane - Careva Česma
- 5th Company: *Feronikl*

3. 122nd Intervention Brigade

- 7th Company: Bradaš - Bojčina - Kasandol - Krpimej
- 3rd Company: Batlava - Hrtica - Krivo drvo
- 6th Company: for manoeuvre action
- 2nd Company: Kisela Banja - Lužane - Penduha

4. 72nd Detachment PJP

- 5th Company: Konjuševac - Gornja Lapaštica - Donja Lapaštica
- 3rd Company: Obrandža - Bradaš - V. Reka

II Secretariat in Kosovska Mitrovica

1. 35th Detachment PJP

- 1st Company: Šipolje
- 2nd Company: Žabare
- 3rd Company: Vaganica
- 4th Company: Tamnik
- 5th Company: Šipolje

2. 85th Detachment

- 1st Company: Čitak - Banja - N. Kosijer - Kladarnica i
- 2nd Company: k. /elevation/ 707 (Devič) - Gecaj mahala (Lauša) - Recaj mahala -
Novo Selo
- 3rd Company: Vučitrn - Doljak - Donji Svračak - Gornji Svračak
- 4th Company: Vitak - Čubrelj - Keć Potok - Berance mahala - Gornja Klina

III Secretariat in Peć

1. 122 Intervention Brigade

- 1st Company: Kluz
- 2nd Company: Nepolje - Česko
- 3rd Company: Lugadija
- 4th Company: Vl. Drenovac - Begovac - Lugadija

2. 72nd Detachment PJP

one company: Ranić - Glodane
 one company: Kijevo - Dolovo
 one company: Sićevo - Ovčarevo
 one company: Kastrati - Voćnjak - Broćna
 one company: Dobra Voda - Cerovik - Čabić

IV Secretariat in Dakovica

1. 23rd Detachment PJP

1st Company: Jablanica
 2nd Company: weekend
 3rd Company: Grgoc - Troja
 4th Company: Don - Straža - Žabalj
 5th Company: weekend
 6th Company: Babaloć
 7th Company: Kraljane
 8th Company: weekend

2. 73rd Detachment PJP

1st Company: weekend
 2nd Company: Junik village - izb.nas /refugee colony/ Babaloć - k. /elevation/ 570
 3rd Company: Crmljane village - Crmljanska čuka /hill/ - Vogelj Čuka - Radonjić - Kraljane
 4th Company: Ponoševac - Smonica village - Brovina - Šišman Ravan
 5th Company: weekend
 6th Company: Rznić - Glodane
 7th Company: Kodralija - Požar - Donja Luka
 8th Company: Dujak village - Istinić village - Streoc village - Papračane

3. 78th Detachment PJP

3rd Company: Đakovica

V Secretariat in Prizren

1. 37th Detachment PJP

1st Company: Koriša - Grejkovce
 2nd Company: Dubrava
 3rd Company: Movljane - Rečane
 4th Company: Gornja Krušica - Budakovo
 5th Company: Mušutište

2. 87th Detachment PJP

1st Company: Orahovac - Studenčane
 2nd Company: Dobrodeljane - Pagaruša
 3rd Company: Reštane - S. Reka - Dulje - Blace
 4th Company: Vran Stena - Troja - Ostrožub
 5th Company: C. Reka - Pečane - Semenište

REMARK: Units of the 124th intervention Brigade are deployed in the area of the Secretariat and the AP /Autonomous Province/ KM /Kosovo and Metohija/ for manoeuvre action and the 74th detachment PJP for territorial security and carrying out other assignments.

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KEEP PERMANENTLY

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/round seal illegible/

COMMAND OF THE PRIŠTINA CORPS**Strictly confidential number 455-205****2 May 1999****VERY URGENT**/round seal:/ Centre for Cooperation with the
International Criminal Tribunal
Belgrade**To the commander personally**

In line with an already-issued order by the Priština Corps Command, in all units of the corps, continue providing accommodation for the civilian population in the zones of responsibility, in settled places and locations, in line with decisions of commanders of brigades and in coordination with the organs of civilian authorities and civilian protection. Put up all population in adequate facilities so that they are not in the open.

In the sectors of accommodation of the civilian population step up security measures and the protection of units from any kind of surprise.

In cooperation with the civilian authorities make a list of the population, create conditions for the fulfilment of their basic needs and prevent any threat to the integrity and personal safety of the population and of their property.

Send a report to the Priština Corps Command on the sectors of accommodation of the civilian population in the zone of the unit, as well as a report on the number of the civilian population.

Also, send a report on possible sectors for the probable reception of new temporarily-displaced persons.

Submit reports by 1600 hrs on 4 May 1999.

/illegible//MT

C O M M A N D E R**Major-General****Vladimir LAZAREVIĆ**

/signed/

/round seal partially legible:/ Command of Priština Corps

Send to: a) encoded: 15th, 211th and 252nd okbr /armoured brigade/, 125th, 549th and 37th mtbr /motorized brigade/, Tactical Group-252, 52nd arbr PVO /artillery rocket brigade of anti-aircraft defence/, 52nd mabr, 243rd mbr /mechanized brigade/, 354th, 175th and 7th pbr, 58th lpbr /light infantry brigade/, 192nd inžp

/engineering regiment/, idb/52nd specbr /reconnaissance and sabotage battalion of the 52nd special brigade/

b) by courier: 52nd bVP /Military Police battalion/, 52nd bv /communications battalion/, 52nd bABHO /atomic-biological-chemical defence battalion/, 52nd idč /reconnaissance-sabotage company/, 52nd čEIO /electronic reconnaissance and interference company/, KS PrK /Headquarters Administration of the Priština Corps/.

37th mtbr /motorised brigade/ Command
 Str. conf. no. 307-2
 3 May 1999

TO PRISTINA CORPS COMMAND

Report including a proposal of measures

Re: Your Order str. conf. no. 455-199 of 1 May 1999

Pursuant to the document, reference number and date cited above, we hereby report to you the following:

1. On the basis of the assigned borders of the zone of responsibility, the brigade command has synchronised its defence documents. Likewise, the areas of responsibilities for the subordinate units have been defined.
2. We believe that it is necessary to emphasise the following once again:
 - that relative to the current zone, the new z/o /zone of responsibility/ is even bigger and that it has been extended;
 - that the brigade in the zone has no units attached or any other to reinforce it (VtOd /military territorial detachment/ and the like);
 - that the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ units are not in the zone yet, under the command of the brigade, because they are allegedly waiting for an order from their superiors;
 - that the zone of the brigade is very complex and still has a large number of ŠTS /Šiptar /Albanian Terrorist Forces/.

For these reasons, it is our realistic assessment that with the current forces we cannot control the whole zone successfully.

With regard to this, I would like to ask you to reconsider our previous proposal to reinforce the brigade with at least one more motorised battalion, and that, through the organs in charge, speed up the process of re-subordination of the MUP units to the brigade commanders in the defence zones, in order to use them more appropriately.

DO/SDJ

COMMANDER
 Colonel
 /illegible/ DIKOVIĆ
 /signed and sealed/

D-49

DATE PLACE TIME	DESCRIPTION OF EVENT	SIGNATURE OF PERSON ENTERING DATA	NOTES	DATE PLACE TIME	DESCRIPTION OF EVENT	SIGNATURE OF PERSON ENTERING DATA	NOTES
12 May 1999 KOSOVO POLJE	<p>During the night and the following day, the NATO Air Force targeted deployment sectors of units in the zone of responsibility of the brigade. Three projectiles were fired at the bridge in the village of Miloševo. The main road between Priština and Kosovska Mitrovica was also targeted. There were constant overflights over our positions. Electronic jamming is present but without significant consequences for the communications within the brigade.</p> <p>The activities of brigade units are aimed at implementing the decision regarding the Gospoda and the Drenica operation. The engineers battalion is destroying unexploded enemy /illegible/ in the sectors of Prilužja, /illegible/ and Lipljan. In addition, its activities are aimed at making a record of minefields for defence. We also continued to ...</p>	/signature illegible/		12 May 1999 KOSOVO POLJE	<p>... construct a bridge in the village of /illegible/. Reconnaissance organs /illegible/ towards Lipovica were gathering intelligence about the STS. Other units are securing the lines of communication and protecting units from air attacks. Logistical units are providing logistical support and repairing combat hardware. There were no losses in personnel or combat hardware. A brigade team was engaged in clearing the front lines in the deployment sector of the 1st okb and the 2nd mb.</p> <p>MB1- COMMANDER Colonel MLADEN ČIRKOVIĆ</p>	/signature illegible/	/stamp/

/handwritten numbers: see original/

3rd ARMY COMMAND

Strictly confidential number: 872-159/2
28 May 1999

MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Copy No. ____

Observations made during the inspection of the 37th mtbr /Motorised Brigade/

To: COMMAND _____

Pursuant to the order of the 3rd Army Commander, strictly confidential number 872-159/1 of 25 May 1999, on 27 May 1999 a team from the 3rd Army Command IKM /Forward Command Post/ carried out an inspection of the 2nd Army's 37th mtbr which is subordinated to the 3rd Army's PrK /Priština Corps/ in the execution of tasks in Kosovo and Metohija.

The inspection included: Brigade Command with the PJ /headquarters support units/, 3rd mtb /Motorised Battalion/, had /Howitzer Artillery Battalion/, and PVO /Anti-Aircraft Defence Artillery Rocket Battalion/, part of the Engineering Battalion /inžb/ and the Logistics Battalion /pozb/.

On the whole, the inspection revealed the following:

a).– Positive solutions:

- The Brigade Command is systematically maintaining and building up the combat readiness of commands and units,
- life and work are organised in accordance with combat environment,
- decisions of the Corps Commander and the Brigade Commander on the use of the Brigade in combat were executed, with minor omissions, at all levels of command,
- combat documents were worked out in accordance with the Commander's decision, albeit with minor omissions,
- all members of the brigade are aware of their tasks and the task of the unit,
- Brigade units have taken up the planned defence sectors - positions,
- necessary security measures have been taken,
- the logistics support system functions well,
- use of ammunition is rational,
- combat morale in the brigade is at the required level,
- measures have been taken to prevent desertion from the Brigade.

b). – Weaknesses, mistakes and failings:

- Parts of combat documents are incomplete, particularly in the 3rd mtb /Motorised Battalion/,
- defence sectors and firing positions are insufficiently fortified,
- some members of the Brigade, reservists in particular, are insufficiently trained for the execution of unit-specific tasks,
- the ard PVO of the Priština Military District Command /KVOK/ resubordinated to the Brigade because it cannot be used in combat due to the lack of vehicles and crews,

- some volunteers in the idč /reconnaissance and sabotage company/ are not disciplined,
- some troops are engaged for other purposes (the ard PVO, the engineering battalion and the logistics battalion on the dispersion of the ŠTS /Šiptar /Albanian/ terrorist forces/),
- weapons /UbS/ are concentrated in one location,
- firefighting support in the p/s /?auxiliary forces/ is insufficient,
- there is not enough information on the state of material supplies /MS/,
- some of the senior officers needed by the Brigade have stayed behind in the Raška Garrison,
- the Brigade failed to bring some equipment it was required to bring according to war-time establishment /RF/.

c). – Problems:

- Part of the 7th pbr /Infantry Brigade/ abandoned their positions, compromising the Brigade's right flank,
- lack of commanding and other senior personnel (13 platoon commanders, one company commander, one battery commander and a NSnSl /chief of medical service/ are missing),
- MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ forces in the sector are not resubordinated to the Brigade Command,
- lack of communications equipment (three MKŠK-1 /small command-and-staff vehicles/, 20 *Motorolas*, 10 RU2/2K radio sets, 86 field telephones, 24 PTK /field telephone cables/, 12 RRU-1 /radio relay sets/ and five TLCl-10 /?inductor switchboards/),
- lack of flak jackets and passive night vision and shooting devices,
- required: 680 helmets, 700 folding entrenching tools and three range finders,
- lack of quartermaster equipment (400 pairs of boots, 5,600 camouflage shirts, 1,200 sleeping bags, 200 military berets and 600 VJ /Yugoslav Army/ insignia),
- vehicles are insufficient and inadequate,
- some engineering machines, artillery weapons and vehicles are in disrepair,
- some engineering sets are incomplete and there is a shortage of pioneer tools.

Conclusion :

On the whole, the situation in the Brigade is good and allows for a successful execution of combat tasks. The above and other weaknesses, mistakes and failings - caused by the lack of responsibility on the part of certain senior officers and the Brigade Command - were pointed out on the spot.

Proposed measures:

a) Brigade level:

- 1.- Deal with the observed weaknesses, mistakes and failings as soon as possible.

b) Corps Command level (Priština Corps and UK /Užice Corps/):

- 1.- If possible, bring the Brigade up to the required levels of personnel and materiel.

2.– Make sure that faulty equipment is repaired.

c) Army Command level (2nd Army and 3rd Army):

- 1.– Bring the Brigade up to required personnel levels.
- 2.– Bring the Brigade up to required materiel levels.
- 3.– Ensure repair of materiel in bad condition.

MS/MK

Attached:

- Observation by team members

TEAM LEADER

C o l o n e l

Mile STANOJKOVIĆ

/stamped and signed/

3rd Mtb

The following situation was observed during the inspection of the 3rd Motorised Battalion of the 37th Motorised Brigade:

- The Battalion took control of the following defence sector: Gladno Selo - tt /trig point/ 756 (Lipoglav) - Gornji Grabovac (the width of the defence sector is approximately 12 km).

1. The Commander ordered the defence to be ready at 0600 hours on 24 May but, according to the statement of the Battalion Commander, a verbal order was subsequently issued, pushing it back by one day.

2. The Battalion Commander's decision was relayed to his subordinates but no supporting documents (diagrams, decisions, orders etc.) were found in either the Command or the subordinate units.

3. Battalion Manning Levels:

- Numerical strength: 806 men or 105%,
- approximately 85% troops are present, with an average of 100 to 120 men absent for various reasons (injured, wounded, absent without leave, etc.).

4. The engineering work that was ordered has not been carried out in full. Very little has been done to fortify the area, there are no shelters for artillery weapons or troops because the unit is carrying out other tasks - primarily mopping up the terrain of ŠTS.

5. Combat equipment is in very good condition (none in bad condition);

- Except in the 3rd tank platoon /tv/ of the 1st tank company /tč/ which has been seconded to the battalion: one T-55 tank has ignition problems. The Battalion's 31 cargo vehicles are not fit for the purpose (there are 15 cargo vehicles from the list and they are having difficulty driving off-road, particularly in the 120 mm mbč /mortar company/. Tractors are currently being used to solve the problem).

6. Quartermaster support is at a level which enables the execution of tasks. However:

- There is a shortage of: 350 sets of M-77 camouflage clothes, 1,300 shirts and approximately 700 pairs of socks,
- there is a shortage of 100 pairs of boots of various sizes.

7. Command and Communications:

- The Battalion KM /Command Post/ was established at the Ldrovac village sector (NE of Staro Čikatovo village),
- radio (partial) and courier communications have been established, but no wire communications.

Conclusion:

- The unit's combat morale is very good, there have been no negative behaviour or problems which would significantly erode the unit's morale and bring into question the execution of its tasks in the future.

Proposed measures:

1. Draft necessary combat documents at all unit levels:
 - Responsible: Battalion Command, deadline: Immediate.
2. Carry out necessary engineering works to required level:
 - Responsible: Battalion Command in co-operation with the Brigade Command.
3. Replenish the 120 mm Mortar Company with six vehicles:
 - Responsible: PkPo /Assistant Commander for Logistics/ in co-operation with the Priština Corps Command and the logistics organ of the 3rd Army IKM /Forward Command Post/.
4. Supply clothes and footwear in accordance with the quantities available at the logistics organs (footwear, i.e. boots, are a priority).
 - Responsible: Brigade Assistant Commander for Logistics /PkPo/ in co-operation with the logistics organs of the Priština Corps and the 3rd Army Forward Command Post.

INSPECTION CARRIED OUT BY:

Colonel
Dragan BAJIĆ
/signed/

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